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Abstract 
Si nce 2002, NATO and the Western powers have been waging a war in Afghanistan and 
altempting to vanquish the roots of terrorism in the troubled nation. The reconstruction 
efforts began even as war continued to be fo ught. A considerably pro-western 
government under President Karzai was installed through electoral processes in 2004. 
vertheless, in 2007 reconstruction efforts seem no farther ahead and successes are 
mi nimal. Foreign interveners view Afghanistan as a tabula rasa upon which they can 
dcrcat the enemy and impose a liberal-democratic political and economic order. But thi s 
wi ll not happen. The country continues to struggle against the influence of neighbors, 
vio lence and corruption of warlords, the ill egal opium trade, as well as ethnic and 
re ligious disparities. Above all , Afghanistan remains subject to violent political 
jockeying. The country continues to grapple with the Taliban insurgency, the threat of 
altacks from remaining al-Qa' ida, and instability. The game being played in Afghanistan 
is much more complex than the West ever envisioned. As long as they continue to 
neglect the numerous nested games, specifically gam es in multiple arenas, embedded 
within the situation and focus solely on the game in the principal arena - defeating the 
Taliban and formin g a pro-liberal state in the Middle East - reconstruction wil l fa il. 
Troops continue to fi lter into Afghanistan but reconstruction and peace are slipping out or 
reach . 
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Introduction 
"The idea that we could just hunt terrorists and we didn 't have to do nation-bui lding, and 
we could just leave it alone, that was a large mistake." 
- Ronald E. Neumann, United States Ambassador to Afghanistan 1 
Afghani stan is a very troubled country. It has witnessed decades of war, which 
have devastated its social, po litical and economic fabric. Rule by various groups and 
ind iv iduals have proven disastrous and unfavorable to the Afghan people, and foreign 
intervention is proving unsuccessful. When the Americans entered Afghanistan in an 
e ffo rt to eradicate the threat of terrorism posed by the Taliban and ai-Qa' ida after I I 
September 200 l , they beli eved they were fi ghting a "good war," one where the terrorists 
wo uld be swiftly and authoritatively suppressed, locals would support and assist them, 
and reconstruction would begin in earnest once the threat was reduced. Unfortunately, 
the "good war" has gone bad. It has certainly not gone according to plan. The Taliban 
and a l-Qa' ida are not eliminated and reconstruction efforts have proven unsuccessfu l to 
date. 
Chapter one introduces the concept of post-confl ict reconstruction. This is the 
obvio us starting point fo r such research. After the West completed its initial mili tary 
campaign against the Taliban and al-Qa' ida, the plan was to reconstruct the country of 
Afghani stan. Post-conflict reconstruction (PCR) activity is the foundation from which 
the rest of the research fl ows. One must fi rst understand PCR before one can understand 
how it has gone "off course" and why it does not adequately descri be the si tuation that 
ex ists within the country at present. Post-conflict reconstruction endeavors entail 
occupati on w ith the purpose of restoring political infrastructure, fac ilities, and social 
,--------------------------------------
services to a country that has been ravaged by war. There is the desire for social change 
to occur through refom1 in political , economic, social, and security sectors. Reform is an 
incred ibl y complex process and will be executed differently in each distinct country. 
Post-connict reconstruction is an ideal situation for a country rebuilding after war, but its 
inherent assumption that most countries can be reconstructed is flawed. PCR assumes the 
presence of a "one-on-one" game where those intervening can accomplish the ir task, in a 
manner dev ised by themselves, through cooperation with a unified domestic actor. 
However, a ll situations and countries are not like this; Afghanistan is a prime example. 
C hapter one also introduces game theory, a well-known theory of internationa l 
relations, as a more adequate tool for understanding the scenario in Afghanistan, why th 
interveners are failing, and how success may be more easily achieved . Game theory fills 
the vo id left by PCR. Whereas PCR sees two distinct sides in reconstruction, game 
theory, specifically nested games theory, a llows for multiple actors and multiple arenas 
w hi ch may contribute to or prohibit successful reconstruction. The two concepts may 
complement each other but game theory is ultimately more useful. There is a gam e being 
played in Afghanistan, but it is not solely between the West and a unified Afghan people 
and government. There are ' nested games' be ing played in Afghanistan that must be 
considered. The concept of ' nested games' developed by George Tsebelis puts forth the 
idea that there may be multiple games being played out simultaneously in multiple arenas 
that will restrict the successful completion of the game being played out in the principa l 
a rena
2 This is indeed the case in Afghanistan. The W est, led by the United States, sees 
onl y o ne game in the principal arena where it works toward establishing pro-Western 
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liberal democracy within Afghani stan. Nevertheless, this is restricted by the fact that 
there are nested games ongoing, wi th actors seeking their own equi librium that wi ll not 
a llow thi s achievement - ethnic disharmony, Paki stan-Afghanistan re lations, Tali ban 
resurgence, powerful warlord rule, and a surging drug economy. Post-conflict 
reconstruction does not allow the introduction of these nested games, however, game 
theory does. Understanding these theories is essential fo r setting up the Afghan istan 
game. 
T he Westem coalition has not had the right focus for its reconstruction endeavors. 
Instead of trying to understand the internal dynamics of thi s complex country and its 
society, the interveners have gone in with their own interpretation of what should be done 
- installing liberal-democratic political and economic insti tutions. The United States and 
other foreign interveners such as NATO are involved in a competitive game in 
Afghani stan, one that they want to win. When the stri fe is over, the West would like to 
see a fri endl y democratic government operating in Afghanistan. The West has focused 
on onl y one game of defeating the enemy and establi shing such a government as its 
primary reconstruction concern. At the same time, they have ignored the embedded 
nested games that are being played out in the country that will restric t the successful 
achievement of the fom1er. In August 2007, Afghan President Hamid Karzai was 
reported as saying that security in his country had "definitely deteriorated ."3 The West's 
reconstruction efforts are failing in Afghanistan, and they will continue to do so until 
these nested gam es are addressed. 
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Chapter two contains a brief history of Afghanistan's decades ofnever-ending 
war and trife. While the historic overview starts quite far into the past, the more in-
depth review begins with the major Soviet involvement in Afghru1istan beginning in the 
1960s. This history is imp01iant in understanding the involvement of many other 
regional powers in Afghanistan as well as the formation of many groups within the 
country in opposition to the Soviet Union. This section of background continues until the 
terrorist attacks of September 2001. The timeline from 9/11 until the present day is given 
specific attention and detail , as it is vital for understru1ding the current game in 
Afghanistan. 
The background and context helps one to understand the subject matter of this 
thesis - Afghanistan. As well, it assists in understanding why the country is in need of 
reconstruction; the 'conflict' of post-conflict reconstruction. Emphasis is on the rise of 
the Taliban and post-9/ 11 , for both the Taliban and the United States are the key players 
in thi s new game. The history identifies the multiple players i.e. the Taliban, 
Mujaheddin, warlords, ethnic groups, and the role of foreign powers like Pakistan. It also 
gives an early understanding of the stakes of the game for each ofthese players (involved 
in nested games) before the outside players (U.S., NATO, ISAF, etc.) are introduced in 
the overarching game. Without this context, the nested games are not as understandable 
because the motivations of key actors seem irrational or unclear. However, many of 
these nested games existed before an intervention into Afghanistan began. Knowing the 
history of the country the West was intervening in would have been helpful; it might have 
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approached reconstruction differently or realized sooner that its game is not the only one 
being played. 
From 2001 to the present situation in Afghanistan the West has been focused on 
o nly one game. This game in the "principal arena" is the subject of chapter three. This 
chapter introduces the outside observer of the game. This outsider is the West, composed 
primarily of the United States, as well as NATO/ISAF, other intervening countries, and 
the United Nations. The West sees Afghanistan as part of an overarching larger game. 
Chapter three elaborates on this idea and establishes the game framework for the rest of 
the paper. 
What is the U.S. really trying to accomplish in Afghanistan? The West desires to 
establish liberal democratic political and economic institutions within the Afghan state. 
This ambition is evident in many U.S. policy documents such as the Security Strategy 
(The so called "Bush Doctrine") and documents relating specifically to Afghanistan, such 
as the Bonn Agreement and the Afghanistan Compact. These policies are analyzed as the 
chapter progresses. What is evident from these documents is that the U.S. is focu sed on 
democracy establishment in Afghanistan and ignores ongoing nested games. Democracy 
promotion with consideration of these nested realities would be more acceptable, and 
internal actors should play a pivotal role, but this does not appear to have been 
considered. The West has entered Afghanistan with a single strategy when there should 
instead be many more; different nested games are each going to involve distinct 
consideration and action. The Western game strategy is important to this analysis 
because it serves as a good contrast to the actual reality on the ground. Armed with the 
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know ledge of the West's game, when one examines the various nested-games it should 
be clearly evident why this strategy invoked by the U.S. and other interveners is not 
working. 
Chapter four is the final and principal analytical chapter of this work. Here the 
argument moves to the nested problems plaguing Afghanistan. Understanding the nested 
games within the country helps explain why there is no success in the game of the West. 
The Western efforts are going to fail in Afghanistan. Why? Because of the nested games. 
Table l: Princip_al Arena Multiple Arenas 
Actors Strategies Actors Strategies 
- The West -Defeat the - Government of -Gain/Maintain 
(observer): U.S., Taliban/al-Qa ' ida Afghanistan Power 
ATO, UN, ISAF -Install pro-liberal, - Taliban/al-Qa' ida - Economic well-
- Government of Western democracy -Pakistan being 
Afghanistan - Ensure security -Warlords - Regional power 
- Opium Industry - 'Pashtunistan ' 
-Ethnic border issue 
groups/tribes -Retain livelihoods 
-Ethnic dominance 
Whi le there are a multitude of nested games being played out simultaneously in 
Afghanistan, there are five major situations that are impeding the successful 
reconstruction of the country and which the West should be more diligently addressing. 
The first is the resurgence of the Taliban. The United States ' reason for entering 
Afghanistan and waging war in the first place was to rid the world of the terrorists who so 
atrociously attacked their country. They were initially fairly successful in this endeavor 
but the Taliban are an embedded force within Afghanistan and it cannot be expected that 
they will be eliminated entirely from Afghan society solely by dropping bombs. The 
Tali ban culture permeates the country and there are new Taliban consistently being 
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recruited. Reconstruction is not effective if such a violent tlu·eat continues to exist. 
Secondly, the relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan is not really understood by 
the West. Tension between these two states has existed for centuries and continues today 
for many of the same reasons and many new ones as well. There is an even greater threat 
as many neo-Tali ban seem to be ori ginating and training in Pakistan. Paki stan is an 
ambiguous all y fo r the West; it may need to deal more heavy-handedly w ith that country 
if violence in Afghanistan is to stop. Thirdly, warlo rds have too much control in the 
state. However, the West initially used them as allies in fighting the Taliban. They 
cannot be easily removed from the picture, but their power is undermining that of the 
centra l government w hich is gradually weakening. A more effective strategy needs to be 
fo rmulated to deal with the warlords, w ho while helpful in some situations are also 
vio lent and key players in the narcotics economy; this is the fourth nested gam e. The 
great majority of revenue in Afghanistan is generated from an illegal economy - the 
growth, production, and trade of opium. Many poor peasants, as well as confl ict 
entrepreneurs garner a li velihood from such practices. The West has tri ed to address this 
situati on through punislunent and possibly eradication, but this hurts the smaller farmers 
and not j ust the warlords on top. A new economic strategy must be devised to handle thi s 
prob lem, but all the players in it must be considered. As long as the narcotics economy 
thri ves there w ill be increased vio lence and a volatile economy. Afghanistan should 
depend on legal products, but it sees no other alternative at the moment. Reconstruction 
should address these issues. The final nested game relates to the history of Afghanistan 
and the conflict between its ethnic groups. Afghanistan does not have a homogenous 
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populati on; there are many di fferent ethnicities and clans represented. For centuries, 
there has been tension and strife between the dominant Pashtun peoples and the other 
gro ups. Thi s new chapter of war and violence in Afghani stan has not helped the tense 
ethnic situation. There has been anger over dominance of one group over another in the 
new government and these sentiments tend to permeate into society at large. Ethnicity is 
another issue that is hindering the West's game and one to which they need to pay 
particul ar attention. Failing to address all of these nested games w ill pro long confl ict, but 
it is also go ing to end any hope o f successful reso lution to the primary arena game. ln 
fact, thi s game should not be the goal to m aking Afghanistan a self-sustaining and more 
peaceful country. Trying to solve the nested games is more likely to achieve thi s goal 
and in the process will likely bring about an Afghan democracy. 
Terrori sm has become a very real threat in recent times and the war on terro rism 
in combination with the war in Iraq, is certainly going to occupy many countri es in the 
Middle East, Southem Asia and beyond for the next decade. The situation in Afghanistan 
cannot be ignored , it now involves too many countries, and more and more troops 
continue to be sent there. Most people are concerned with the fighting alone in 
Afghani stan; so ldiers are dying. There are generally two opinions, either stay the course 
and e liminate those who are doing so much harm or leave so that no more harm can be 
done. Little attention is paid to the reconstruction part of the war; in reality, however, a 
lot of attention should be given to it. The reconstruction efforts in Afghani stan have been 
getting progressively worse since the war began and are at risk of fa iling entirely. 
Preoccupation with the gam e of establishing pro-Western liberal democracy on the part 
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of the West, while ignoring nested games that are ongoing and prohibiting adequate 
reconstruction, is only go ing to lead to overall failure for the reconstruction efforts. 
The final section of the paper di scusses the role of Canada in Afghanistan. This 
add ition is primarily for comparative purposes, but also to acknowledge other 
interveners. The decision for Canada to j oin in on the war was not made lightly and it 
was not favo red by many Canadians, who viewed the war as "American" and part of their 
war on terror after 9/11 . However, as a member and supporter of the UN, Canada 
responded to a UN Security Co unci I (UNSC) resolution authorizing an international 
security assistance force, which called upon member states to contribute personnel, 
equipment, and resources. As a member of the UN but hesitant to outright support war, 
Canada appears to have paid more attention to reconstruction in a holistic way, rather 
than just the principal arena game. The Canadian teams in Afghanistan have been 
spending time working with the Afghan National AI111y, patrolling one of the most 
dangerous provinces in the country, making efforts in counter-narcotics, and so forth. 
Canada stands in contrast to many of the more Western centered efforts and is therefore a 
usefu l example of what reconstruction might become, but there is still more than needs to 
be done to take on the difficult task of nested games than just trying to fit Afghanistan 
into a preconceived mould. Indeed, Canada did enter Afghanistan in 2001 in support of 
the U.S. and lSAF in its endeavors to fight terrorism and work towards democracy, not 
with an initi al goal to reconstruct a country. These are goals that ultimately derive fro m 
the Bush Doctrine. 
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The events in Afghanistan should not just be viewed with concern because of the 
"war," the deaths of soldiers and civilians, and the terrorist threat. An Afghanistan not 
prope rl y reconstructed poses a tlu·eat to the stability of the entire region which may spark 
ru rthe r conflict in the future. A holistic reconstruction approach will help in preventing 
the terrorist tlu·eat from having an even greater resurgence. Most importantly, not 
ensuring reconstruction is executed effi ciently and successfully will only prolong the 
confli ct for more years to come. Already the war has gone on far longer than many 
believed it would and it shows no sign of abatement. Reconstruction must occur or else 
the West will fail and Afghanistan will slide further into chaos. Nested game theory 
makes it evident why the West will not succeed in its game and w hy the post-conflict 
reconstruction literature is not a useful analytical tool for understanding the situation in 
Afghani stan and the failure of the West. 
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Chapter· One- Understanding and Inter·preting Post-Conflict Reconstr·uction 
The goals of the U.S. led mission into Afghanistan were threefold: to defeat ai-
Qa'ida and Taliban forces through military operations, to begin a political process that 
would create a democratic government in the country, and to provide long-term aid for 
humanitarian relief and reconstruction. 4 While the military strategy embarked upon in 
Afghanistan scattered much of the ai-Qa'ida network, it has not, however, produced the 
capture or confirmed the death of top al-Qa'ida leader Osama bin Laden. Since 200 I 
there have been many human casualties and atrocities conm1itted by ai-Qa'ida and the 
Tal iban, nevertheless, the efforts ofNATO and its partners within the country do not 
appear to be improving the Afghan situation sufficiently. The establishment of a 
nationwide Loya .Tirga ('grand council') in 2002 and the subsequent election ofHamid 
Karzai as President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in 2004 signaled what should 
have been a new beginning for the war-torn country. It is becoming evident, however, 
that the government 's exclusion of some groups and parties is resulting in failure. 5 
Without reconciliation, the country remains a multi-party/multi-group state at odds with 
one another. Reconstruction efforts in other areas are likewise failing. Everyone would 
I ike to see post-conflict reconstruction (PCR) succeed and have a country ravaged by 
years of war and internal strife turn itself around and become an independent, properly 
functioning, democratic state. However, this is unlikely to happen. Post-conflict 
reconstruction, based on a normative construct, is reflective of an ideal situation. But not 
all countries are the same and will not be reconstructed similarly. Post-conflict 
reconstruction in its current form assumes a 'one-on-one game' ; a game where there are 
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two sides: one to be reconstructed (willingly) and the other who does the reconstruction. 
Thi s is na"lve, especially in the case of Afghanistan where there are many players in the 
game. 
1.1 T!te Nature of Post-Conflict Reconstruction 
According to Derick Brinkerhoff, failing and failed states such as Afghanistan are 
characteri zed by three main features: a breakdown in law and order where the state loses 
its monopoly on the legitimate use of force; a weakened capacity to respond to citizens ' 
needs; and a Jack of a credible entity that represents the state beyond its borders. In such 
cases, reconstruction efforts may be undertaken to create a more legitimate and stab le 
state, in the eyes of its own people and the intemational community.6 
Though minimal reconstruction efforts are currently being undertaken in 
Afghanistan, this poses a problem in and of itself. Reconstruction efforts are generally 
considered to be "post-conflict." Once the state is relatively stable it is considered to be 
more conducive to reconstruction endeavors. But conflict is sti ll a very prominent part of 
the Afghan reality. Rebuilding in Afghru1istan has not been undertaken on the basis of a 
serious need to rebuild, or as part of a well planned process following a peace agreement 
with in the country. Instead, reconstruction has been initiated as part of a "knee-jerk 
reaction" by external actors following 9/11.7 
"Post-conflict rarely means that violence and strife have ended at a given moment 
in a ll corners of a country' s territory. In practice, most post-conflict reconstruction 
e fforts take place in situations where conflict has subsided to a greater or lesser degree, 
but is ongoing or recurring in some parts of the country."8 Reconstruction requires 
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intervention with the goal of rebuilding political infrastructure, facilities, and minimal 
social services. As well, social change will occur when the political , economic, and 
social sectors are reformed. Reconstruction efforts are immensely complex; 
interventions strive to have "a rehabilitative dimension oriented to the past, a resolutive 
di mension oriented to the present, and a preventive dimension oriented to both present 
and future."9 Quite obviously, post-conflict situations are not easily defined. 
There are various ways of looking at post-conflict reconstruction. With respect to 
timing and development, Sultan Barakat explains that there are two schools of thought. 
The first is that peace is a precondition for reconstruction. The second believes that 
through the initiation of reconstruction at a point in the conflict, long-term recovery will 
result. G lobal experience has proven the second occurs more often, provided that 
rebui !ding itse lf is approached as a national proj ect. 10 lt is vital that all national actors are 
considered and included in post-conflict reconsh·uction efforts. 
In today's world, PCR is generally considered to consist of four distinct yet 
connected categories of tasks known as the " pillars" ofPCR. 11 The first is security. This 
invo lves all safety initiatives that create a safe and secure environment while developing 
effective security institutions. The second is justice and reconciliation which addresses 
the need to heal the wounds of past abuses as well as address issues arising from war. 
C reating an impartial and accountable legal system is imperative to this pillar. The third 
pillar relates to social and economic well-being. This category is concemed with 
"restoring essenti al services, providing emergency relief, and laying the foundation for a 
viable economy." The final aspect consists of govemance and participation . This pillar 
13 
deals with the need to create legitimate and effective political institutions and 
partic ipatory processes. For any post-conflict reconstruction effort to succeed, it is 
believed that work in these four areas must be carefully integrated. As well , if the 
resources are lacking for any one of them, all the others may prove to have been pursued 
in vain . However, di fferent groups, organizations and individuals vary on what they view 
as the priorities of post-conflict reconstruction efforts . 
The implementation of governance reforms is vital to the post-conflict 
reconstruction process. But governance is a broad tern1 . Governance reform s target three 
main areas which keep in line with the pillars of reconstruction: reconsti tuting legitimacy, 
re-establi shing security and rebuilding effectiveness. Legitimacy refers to acceptance of 
a governing regime as appropriate or right. Without a degree of legitimacy, states 
runction ineffectively. The reconstitution of legitimacy in post-conflict countries 
inc ludes expanding participation throughout society, creating accountable government, 
reducing inequali ties in society, fighting corruption, and holding elections. 12 Democracy 
is generally considered to be the most legitimate forn1 of government worldwide. 
However, in many countries the road to democracy has been tumultuous and often 
disastrous. lt is debatable whether reconstruction endeavors should aim to install 
democrati c institutions or whether an individual country should be able to develop its 
own rorm of governance as long as it has the support of society. 
Re-establi shing security entails di sarmament, demobilization and reintegration. 
O nl y when securi ty has been established in the state can other reconstruction activities 
progress. An insecure environment is not conducive to effective governance creation. It 
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is a barrier to fostering legitimacy (especially in the eyes ofthe international community), 
impedes the restoration of basic services, and oftentimes conflict is ongoing making the 
task of reconstruction virtually impossible. 
Finally, rebuilding effectiveness includes basic service provision coupled with 
e rfective economic governance, both of which require a properl y functioning private 
sector and civil society as well as governrnent. 13 Ensuring these tlu·ee components is 
bel ieved to be central to any reconstruction effort. However, this cannot just be an 
internationa l undertaking or a solely national effort; both parties are needed for 
reconstruction to succeed. Likewise, internally, both national and subnational actors have 
an important role to play in post-conflict reconstruction. Little can be achieved without 
local in vo lvement in the reconstruction process. It is impotiant that both the foreign and 
national govemments work together. 14 
Post-conflict reconstruction demands reconstruction of the central government of 
a country in trouble, and it tends to be assumed that foreign governments will generate 
such an outcome. However, national actors have a far greater understanding of the 
country in question than other intervening powers there to fight terrorism and for 
humanitarian reasons. Nevertheless, a state that is in a post-conflict situation will need 
ass istance to start reconstruction. A balance must be struck between intemational and 
national actor presence. Within the country itself there is also a fine balance to be 
established for central governments may not represent all of the interests w ithin a 
country. In many post-conflict states there are two goveming entiti es. There is a de jure 
state that exists by fiat of the intemational community which recognizes them as 
15 
sovereign entities, regardless of whether or not they have a govenm1ent which can 
e ffectively control and administer the ten·itory. There is often also a de facto state that 
actually administers the territory in many respects. 15 As will be discussed, this is the case 
in the country of Afghanistan. The de jure state under President Karzai , has very weak 
institutions and lacks military and administrative control in many parts ofthe country. 
The de f acto states are operated by regional warlords and local commanders who wield 
considerable power. These subnational groups have significant control militarily and 
economically. There is weakness on the part of the cle jure state at this leve1. 16 
Post-conflict reconstruction is an incredibly complex process with no ensured 
outcome. Every post-conflict society varies in many ways and no one post-conflict 
structure fits every war-ravaged country. There is no universally accepted theory as to 
how post-conflict reconstruction should be executed, although the four pillars ar wide ly 
considered to be vital components to any endeavor. Emphasis is often put on one pillar 
over another but they are all recognized as important. Nevertheless, there is great 
s ignificance placed on the involvement and role of not just foreign actors in the 
reconstruction process, but national actors as well. Without the involvement of all parties 
with vested interests in the country, post-conflict reconstruction efforts wi II not succeed. 
Reconstruction is a fragile process ridden with multiple dilemmas that must be addr ssed. 
First, long term political commitment from foreign actors should not assume that 
there is a national agreement on a vision for the country. Internal actors do not always 
share the idyllic notion that their country can be ref01med by Western ideals and they 
16 
o rten have their own agendas. In many countries, like Afghanistan, there are so many 
different groups that are or should be involved, that reaching consensus is very difficult. 
Second, at the current time there is no neutral space for debate to enable a vision 
lor Afghani stan to emerge. Institutions must be developed at the national, regional and 
local levels, as a means for exchange and cooperation among these institutions and 
between them and international actors. The creation of political space is pivotal for the 
emergence of a representative and cohesive system. Political space requires both a 
physical area and a social environment where the various groups can meet together, 
negotiate, and plan for the future, away from the chaos ofwar. 17 
Third, it is dangerous to assume the current level of political support and 
commitment to the rebuilding of Afghanistan will continue indefinitely. While many 
were optimistic when the foreign intervention began, thjs optimism is waning. There has 
been some trouble receiving pledges of aid that have already been guaranteed, and there 
has been no sign of a cessation in armed conflict as more troops enter the country. 
Fourth , there is a risk of external perception of war-torn societies - that they are a 
b lank sheet on which no remnant of former order exists and onto which actors can 
impose their externally devised solutions. This is occurring in Afghanistan as external 
powers seek to impose a liberal-democratic system on a country that is not receptive to it 
based on its internal realities. 
Fi fth , the way in which economic reconstruction is being approached is not 
working. Economic endeavors cannot focus solely on physical reconstruction; there must 
be a more encompassing approach undertaken. Support for livelihoods, small 
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communiti es, demobilized soldiers, women, people wi th disabilities, heritage, and 
tructures of governance cannot be disregarded. 
S ixth, the embedding of neo-liberal economics may not be in the long-term 
interests of the country. There is a fear that exploitation of natural resources by M Cs, 
healthcare and education with limited welfare provisions, and so on may lead to 
entrenched povetiy. 
Finally, reconstruction must benefit the urban and rural populations. The 
population of Afghanistan is seventy-five percent rural , and yet the focus of 
reconstruction is on urban centres, such as Kabul. This practice needs to be altered. 
However, it will be a di fficult task since the government does not control the 
"d 18 countrys1 e. 
Post-conflict reconstruction is a normative framework for reconstruction. It is not 
a distinct and testable theory. Instead of being firm and specific, PCR explains what one 
can take from lessons of the past in reconstructing a country in the present. Rather than 
explic itl y stating the conditions under which reconstruction will achieve success or 
railurc, PCR is more a menu of options and ideas; recommendations for how 
reconstruction should be carri ed out. The literature relating to PCR is inherently limit d, 
with unc lear vari ables and little infom1ation about actor' s strategies. These shortfalls 
make the PCR literature merely a set of guidelines and not a theory capable of predicting 
the success or failure of a PCR effort itself. 
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I. 2 Game Theory and its Implications for Post-Conflict Reconstruction 
Game theory is useful for theorizing the challenges of post-conflict 
reconstruction . Game theory is a theory of independent decisions - where the decisions 
or two or more individuals combined determine the outcome of a situation. The 
"i ndividuals" can be persons or collective entities that make consistent choices. 
Individual 's choices are often shaped by their social settings, which social scientists call 
"structure." Game theory can provide a method of fonnalizing structures and examining 
the effects of structure on individual decisions. 19 In the context of this research, one 
might ask, how does the structure in Afghanistan influence the success of foreign 
interveners' attempts to impose liberal-democratic political and economic institutions on 
the country? Game theory is complementary to and in fact enhances the post-conflict 
reconstruction literature, by specifying clearer conditions for success. 
In any post-conflict reconstruction situation there is generally an outsider, 
intervening power that enters a country with a mission to reconstruct it. This may 
involve continued military involvement, development assistance, security measures, 
governance building, and so forth. In many cases the post-conflict country has been 
considered a threat of some sort to the intervening power. Afghanistan, for example, was 
seen as a source of terrorism and hence as a security threat. Where two entities come 
together under an atmosphere of hostility, there is the potential for conflict. Game theory 
is useful for examining these situations because it deals with relationships (games) 
between sides (players), the importance of the choices they make, and how these 
decisions affect the other players. Game theory is particularly relevant for examining 
19 
how players may change a situation of conflict to one of cooperation and it addresses the 
issue of multiple players, which is what needs to be accomplished and considered for 
post-conflict reconstruction to be successful. The post-conflict reconstruction literature 
proposes broad pillars to act as guidelines for reconstruction efforts but fails to specify 
the necessiti es for success. 
Actors choose their actions within political situations. "Game theory forces us to 
confront the endogenity of behavior."20 It naturally leads one to consider choices that are 
o ff the equilibrium path. Game theory provides a manner in which to understand the 
complexity of strategic interaction and helps to think about social structure. When one 
sees a situation as a game, they have specified the choices of the players and their 
consequences. That specification is a representation of social structure. 21 The concept of 
nested games, introduced below, further elaborates on the complexity of games with 
multiple players. A game often implies competition. Thinking of the situation as a game 
may help the actors to make strategically wiser decisions within the game. 
For example, the West particularly needs to be aware of the game they are 
playing, who the players are, and what choices these players have if the West is to come 
out of Afghanistan with a success rather than the failure that looms ahead. "The ultimate 
goal is the achievement of a self-sustaining liberal democratic, economic and social order 
that does not r Iy on external monetary or military support."22 Their job generall y begins 
w ith rebuilding the government and political order, shifting the ideology and operations 
o f the political structure, and drastically changing the pre-war political structure.23 
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However, efforts to impose liberal democracy in weak and fai led states via occupation 
and reconstruction have largely failed. 
1.3 Tlte Intricacies of Game Theory: Nested Games 
The concept of nested games has been researched quite extensively by George 
Tscbelis and is a very appropriate theoretic tool for understanding the chal lenges of post-
confli ct reconstruction and why reconstruction efforts in countries like Afghanistan teeter 
on the brink of fai lure. Game Theory in its basic form does not leave room for the 
possibi lity of sub-optimal action. Cases of apparently sub-optimal choice are cases of 
disagreement between actor and observer. Nested games take into consideration 
appa rentl y sub-optimal choices by players and the reasons for them. 
Nested games focus on games between observers and multiple actors. If, w ith 
adequate information, an actor's decision appears to be sub-optimal, it is because the 
observer' s perspective is incomplete. What seems sub-optimal with relation to one game 
may in fact be optimal when the whole network of games is considered. There are two 
reasons for disagreement between the actor and observer: they are involved in games in 
multiple arenas or a gam e ofins6tutional design. 24 Games in multiple arenas are the 
rocus of this research. 
In games in multiple arenas, the observer focuses on only one overarching game 
in the "principal arena", but the other actors are involved in a whole network of nested 
games.25 The observer di sagrees with choices made by the actor because the former 
sees the implications of the latter choices only for the principal arena. However, when 
the implications in other areas are considered, the actor's choice may be seen as a rational 
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strategy.26 The observer does not take into consideration contextual factors; w hereas the 
actor perceives that the game is nested inside a bigger game that defines how contextual 
factors influence his payoffs and those of other players.27 Gam es in multiple arenas are 
games with variable payoffs; the game is played in the principal arena, and the variations 
of payoffs here are determined by events in the other arenas.28 An optimal alternative in 
one arena (or game) will not necessaril y be optimal with respect to the whole network of 
arenas in which the actor is involved. Contextual or institutional factors often have 
overriding imp01iance.29 An actor's actions and decisions may sometimes seem 
suboptimal, but it is often the case that the observer has an incomplete perspecti ve. Most 
of the time these complex, "back and forth" multiple games are a complete and accurate 
representation of reality on the ground . 
The usefulness of games in multiple arenas is in studying situations in which 
pol iti cal context is important and the situation is so complicated that reference to 
exogenous factors is required. Thi s is the case in post-conflict reconstruction. 1n 
A fghani stan, multiple groups within the country are the actors, w hile the West is the 
observer. Logicall y, under these conditions, nested gan1e theory predicts that theW st 
will fa il to understand the strategies of the other players. As such, it will be difficult to 
move the game to an optimal situation . Failure to integrate the challenges of these nested 
games into post-conflict reconstruction will ultimately lead to failure. 
Indeed, many countries have internal structures that do not allow for successful 
reconstruction. Tyler Cowen and Clu·istopher Coyne cite Bosnia and Somalia as recent 
examples. Bosni a has a multi-l ayered structure consisting of numerous entities w ith 
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conflicting interests. The complicated structure of the Bosnian government, coupled with 
ex ternal influences, makes cooperation difficult to achieve, as conflict permeates all 
lcvels.30 Somalia is another very useful example when trying to understand Afghanistan. 
Somali society consists of various clans and subgroups which are vitally important in 
understanding the evolution of the social, economic and political landscape. Somalia has 
no ex perience with centralized liberal democratic govemment - no such a game has ever 
evo lved internally. There are multiple smaller games between clans, warlords, clergy, 
NGOs, etc. However, govenm1ent under the particularly repressive Muhammad Sid 
Barre still fu nctioned throughout Somalia and enabled most of the population to survive. 
The regime was effectively able to settle Somalia's principal arena game through force, 
coercion and repression.31 During the time of foreign involvement by the UN in Somalia, 
the country co llapsed into a state of chaos. With the UN's exit, widespread order was 
achieved with only pockets of conflict throughout the country. There are strong 
arguments that attempts by foreign governments to revitalize a central state since 199 1, 
have on ly served to increase the level of armed conflict. There have been thirteen failed 
foreign-led attempts at national reconciliation in Somalia since 1991.32 
In reality, each weak and failed state will be characterized by a unique set of 
nested games that preclude a "one-size-fits-all" policy by the international community. 
The specific nature of these smaller games will vary from place to place. Some may limit 
the abi lity to establish central liberal-democratic political institutions, while others may 
be conducive and supportive ofthis.33 In the case of Afghanistan, the nested gam es are 
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limiting this achievement and are also proving that liberal-democratic nonns are probab ly 
not the ri ght answer for Afghanistan. 
1.4 The Afghanistan War: Setting-Up the Game 
As has been concluded above, the game being played out in Afghanistan is one in 
multiple arenas; no optimal solution has been reached in this game because this reality 
has gone unaddressed. The West has failed to recognize that the principal arena of action 
is not the only one in which the govemment of Afghanistan is involved. The West views 
the actions of Afghanistan as sub-optimal, but this is because their perspective as 
observer is incomplete. 
The West has entered the country as foreigners, unaware of many of the internal 
realities of the state. lt sees itself as dealing with only one actor - the government of 
Afghanistan. However, the list of actors is greater than this. In dealing with the 
government, it is also dealing with Pakistan, warlords, ai-Qa'ida and the Taliban, 
multiple players within the drug industry, and numerous ethnic groups and tribes. Each 
actor in turn, is involved in a separate arena. The arenas are as follows : 
• Principal arena - war; West vs. Afghanistan (terrorists and government) 
• Al-Qa'ida and the Taliban vs. Government of Afghanistan (and the West) 
• Pakistan vs. Government of Afghanistan 
• Warlords vs. Govemment of Afghanistan 
• Drug Industry vs. Government of Afghanistan 
• Ethnic Groups vs. Government of Afghanistan 
There are not one but six different arenas in which the govermnent of Afghanistan is 
involved. Likewise, there are just as many different strategies of the actors associated 
w ith each of the arenas. 
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The Western strategy in Afghanistan is threefold: to ensure their security, to 
defeat the terrorists, and to install W estern oriented democracy in the country. The 
Government of Afghanistan wishes to comply with the W est and ensure security of the 
country and region, as well as defeat terrorism. However, this is unachievable as the 
West would desire because the government is dealing with other actors. Afghanistan 
would also like to be able to rule from the centre, but other power players have created a 
decentralized fonn of government. Al-Qa'ida and the Taliban would like to see 
themselves in power and bring about the defeat of their enemy, the West. Likewise, the 
warlords within the country wish to retain the ir autonomy and power, and continue to 
prov ide for Afghans as they always have. Pakistan is an ally of the West but 
s imultaneously an enemy, as it seeks more power within the region and resolution to 
issues over the border. M embers of the drug industry are fighting to retain their 
li velihood while the West seeks to destroy it. Ethnic groups and tribes continue to spar 
over age-o ld differences between each other and primary ethnic rule ofthe country. A ll 
of these issues face the Government of Afghanistan and are the multiple arenas with 
w hich it must deal. Mutually optimal strategies do not currently exist between the actors 
in the game and are unlikely to as long as the West is only focused on the game within 
the primary arena. 
[fthe West desires to successfully initiate post-conflict reconstruction with 
Afghani stan, they too need to be involved in all six arenas. Or else, it needs to be 
realized that there will be no optimal solution to the game in the principal arena of which 
they are so concerned. Equilibrium is unlike ly to be teached. 
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Cnnclu.<iiiou 
There is a game being played out in Afghanistan. Reconstruction efforts in the 
country have focused on resolving the principal arena game of creating self-sustaining 
liberal democratic institutions while neglecting the nested games embedded within the 
principal arena. This is the void left by the PCR structure. All situations are not cut and 
dry. Game Theory fills this void and helps better explain the success and/or failure of 
reconstruction efforts; it allows for games with multiple players and intertwining gam s. 
The actors in this game consist of the Western intervening powers and multiple groups 
within Afghanistan. The West appears to see itself as involved with only one other group 
- the Government of Afghanistan. With these two sides in mind they have attempted to 
resolve the game only within the principal arena. But the game is more complicated than 
that as there are nested games to consider. The West is playing not just against the 
Afghan government as a solitary entity, but a wide variety of other players - warlords, 
the illegal opium economy, ethnic disparity, and meddling neighbors. All ofwhich have 
to be taken into consideration in order to bring resolution to the game. 
Many reconstruction efforts focus on " lessons learned" for establishing future 
efforts. Such actions assume that foreign powers can achieve the desired result of 
sustaining liberal orders. However, it is unclear whether or not occupiers can generate 
peace and self-sustaining cooperation around liberal-democratic ends. Reconstruction 
suffers from a "nirvana fallacy."34 Liberal democracy is widely held to be the 
governance system with the strongest form of legitimacy around the world . Nevertheless, 
in many countries the road to democratization has proven disastrous. In these cases, 
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Lradilional, internal and informal sources of authority and power compete for legitimacy, 
often creating an alternate "state" within a state. An example of this would be regional 
\.varlords within Afghanistan . Past state reconstruction endeavors have shown that 
ex ternal intervention to create liberal democratic societies out of the ashes of intra-state 
differences and divisions is extremely difficult. Some question whether govemance in 
thi s form can emerge from the international designs of outsiders, regardless of how well 
meaning they may be. It is questionable whether "a standardized model of post-conflict 
democratic transition can be grafted onto societies with histories and traditions that may 
be inhospitable to such transfers."35 
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Chapter Two -The Roots of Conflict in Afghanistan 
Any analysis of the Afghan conflict requires an understanding of the complex 
his tory of state formation and societal-state relations. The background helps one to 
understand why the country of Afghanistan is in need of reconstruction; the ' conflict' of 
post-conflict. It also provides the contextual factors for understanding the games 
currently being played. This historical review is not intended to give a particular 
perspective on the situation in Afghanistan; it is solely the facts needed for a basic 
understanding of the current situation. 
Afghanistan is a mosaic of ethnic groups and a crossroads between the East and 
West; partially on account of this it has been invaded and conquered numerous times by 
Alexander the Great, the Muslim Arabs, Turkic and Mongol nomads, the British Empire, 
the Soviet Union, and the United States of America. These conquests have also served to 
create and transform the ethnic consciousness of a state which already had ethnic 
divisions of its own. Foreign invasions altered the indigenous population both by 
inflicting heavy native casualties and infusing new blood into the region. By the time of 
Soviet involvement in the late 1970s, there were significant populations ofTajiks, 
Uzbeks, Hazara, Aimaq, and Farsiwan in Afghanistan, as well as many other small 
groups. Since the nineteenth century there has been a great struggle for power between 
various clans, with no central authority exerting control. The Pashtun were the most 
dominant group, however. The word Afghan was originally nothing more than a 
variation of the word Pashtun. Therefore, Afghanistan meant "land of the Pashtun."36 
These primarily Sunni peoples have provided virtually all of Afghanistan's rul ers since 
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the mid-1 800s. ln this nineteenth century period of anarchy there would develop an 
increased ethnic consciousness - although not a sense of nationalism - that would lay the 
roundation for the ethnic relationships in Afghanistan today. 37 The conflict that began in 
these early years has continued into the present with some new players but most remain 
the same. The history of conflict in Afghanistan helps to set up the game that is being 
played today - the players, their strategies, their payoffs, and their likeliness of success. 
2.1 Tile Soviet Impact on Afghanistan 
Anglo-Russian competition in Central Asia ultimately led to the creation of the 
modern Afghan state, created its ethnically divisive border, and contributed significantly 
to the seri es of wars within Afghanistan. The deadly combination of foreign invasion 
coupled with intemal anarchy created a "state structure without a concomitant 
development of an Afghan nation."38 When this phase of war ended, Afghanistan was 
rree to conduct its own affairs without foreign involvement and ultimately became an 
independent state in 1919. This momentous occasion would not bring peace however. 
To the North, the Soviet Union was consolidating its own influence over the region. 
The expansion of Soviet involvement into Afghanistan began under the rule of 
Mohammed Daoud (1953-1963), first cousin to King Zahir Shah. As Prime Minister, 
Daoud courted the Soviets in part because of his troubles with Pakistan and r lative 
neglect by the United States.39 Afghanistan was at odds with Pakistan over the Durand 
Line - the poorly demarcated border between the two countries. The border had been 
c reated by Britain and Russia many years before. It was a source of great hostility 
between Afghanistan and Pakistan for in Afghan opinion it divided its Pashtun people. 
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This disputed region, known as "Pashtuni stan," was felt by Afghans to belong to them 
and it has been a continuous source of conflict between the two states.40 In 1963, Daoud 
was lorced to resign by the king due to his inflex ibility with the Pashtuni stan issue and 
subsequent lack of peace between the two countries. 
The years between 1963 and 1973 saw an experiment with democracy in 
A lghani stan under the rule of Zahir Shah. He made numerous changes in the pursuit of 
the contro lled democratization of politics, liberalization of social and economic li fe and 
rationa lization of forei gn relations, a ll under a constitutional monarchy. 41 While many 
pos iti ve changes were made, there were still many problems within the country. There 
continued to be a potent "Daoudist" network alive in the country. Daoud who had been 
lorced to resign began to plan a return to power. Simultaneously, many informal groups 
were formed in opposition to the king's regime; Parcham, which was Kabul based, and 
Klwlq , which was rural based, were the most vocal.42 The "New Democracy" was thus 
greatl y undermined. 43 
Parcham and Khalq joined forces in 1965 to form the People's Democratic Party 
of Afghanistan (PDPA), modeled on the Russian Social Democratic Party but operating 
under a nationalist guise.44 Tts aim was the monarchy's eventual downfall , although it 
sp lit on account of internal antagonisms in 1967. In 1971, with the fear that democracy 
wo uld take over and there would be little room left for the Communists, the Soviets 
instigated an alliance between Daoud and Parcham. In 1973 Daoud returned to power in 
a coup, proclaiming Afghanistan a republic and himself as President, Prime Minister, 
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Minister of Defense, and Foreign Affairs. He initiated a foreign policy that the Soviet 
Union could feel comfortable with.45 
Daoud had his own vision of a nationalist, modem, secular, and neutral 
Afghanistan. In pursuing this, he failed to make his program for the country acceptable 
to the traditional and Islamic element of Afghan society. Daoud also began to court both 
Egypt and Iran, a move that made the Soviet Union uneasy. He soon began an extensive 
purge of Parchamis and Khalqis who threatened his leadership and they soon came out in 
defiance against him.46 The purge of Communists by Daoud tlu·eatened the Soviet Union 
and they reunited the PDPA against him. In 1978 a coup by the PDPA installed a pro-
Soviet PDPA Marxist/Leninist government in Afghanistan.47 Violence emerged as the 
determining factor in state-society relations. 
2.2 Civil War - From Soviet Occupation to the Taliban 's Rise 
The current cycle of violence in Afghanistan can be traced back to the pro-soviet 
m iIi tary coup of 1978 that plunged the country into what has become nearly thirty years 
of ongoing war. In 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. Intemational opinion at 
the time of the coup was quick to respond and overwhelmingly negative, especially from 
the United States, but little was done to remedy the situation. However, a national 
rebellion erupted against the oppressive Soviet regime. When atrocities against Afghan 
c ivilians began and civil war ultimately broke out, the Soviet-fearing U.S. began to aid 
Pakistan and provide assistance and logistic suppoti to Afghan Islamic resistance forces, 
known as the Mujabeddin. The period of Soviet occupation from late 1979-1989 was 
31 
marked by fierce resistance from the Mujaheddin, backed by the U.S. and the Pakistan 
Intelligence Service (ISI).48 
When Mikhail Gorbachev became Soviet leader in 1985, the Afghan situation 
ceased being a Soviet priority. With Gorbachev's reforms of the USSR came a desire to 
end the conflict in Afghanistan and he initiated a series of peace talks in Geneva. 49 The 
final set of talks in March 1988 ended in an agreement and called for a nine-month 
phased Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. This was completed on 15 February 1989. 
When the Soviet Union finally broke apart in 1991 , the end of Communism in Kabul was 
at hand. 
After the fall and withdrawal of the Soviets, rival Mujaheddin groups and militi as 
could not settle on an acceptable power sharing arrangement, and fightin g flared-up 
between groups who allied with each other in shifting arrangements. In 1992, the 
Peshawar Accord between many of these groups signaled the end of the pro-Soviet 
regime. 5° The accord provided for the establ ishment of an interim govemment in 
Afghani stan and the Mujaheddin took over Kabul and declared Afghanistan an Islamic 
state. Therefore, war did not end after the Soviet withdrawal but was transformed into a 
national civil war. Many became skeptical of the possibility that Afghanistan would ever 
have a peaceful transition to a legitimate national government. 
The civil war was fought primarily between tlu·ee Mujabeddin groups led by three 
powerful leaders of different ethnicities, all warlords and all wanting to rule the country. 
The leaders ofthese three groups were: Abdul Rashid Dostum, an Uzbek and Chief of 
Staff and Commander in Chief of the Afghan armed forces ; Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, an 
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Arghan Pashtun warlord and fom1er Prime Minister who was nurtured by the Pakistani 
ISJ to head the post-Communist govemment; and Ahmed Shah Massoud, an equally 
powerfu l Tajik who worked alongside the King Burhanuddin Rabbani.51 Massoud and 
Hckmatyar ' s groups in particular, were locked in a bloody power struggle instigated by 
1-l ekmatyar' s excessive power ambitions, his rivalries with other leaders, and ethno-
linguistic and ideological differences. Jamiat-e Is/ami was led by Massoud and was a 
regional and tribal cross-section. Hezb-e l slami was led by Hekmatyar and was 
predominantly Pashtun. He fom1ed the group when he was in exile in Pakistan and it had 
Lhc support of Pakistan and the ISI. While both groups had significant clout, Massoud 
was considered better positioned to takeover Kabul due to his well organized and 
discip lined forces. When he formed an alliance with Dostum, together they successfully 
seized Kabul. 52 A lthough the Peshawar Agreement was concluded between the 
Mujaheddin leaders, Hekmatyar still desired leadership of Afghanistan, and in the 
summer of 1992 he launched rocket attacks, increasing the violence of the civil war. The 
s ide-switching Dostum then formed an alliance with Hekmatyar and launched further 
attacks on Kabul. Hekmatyar wanted to ensure that Massoud could not consolidate 
power or expand hi s territorial control.53 Hekmatyar was unable to wrest power from 
Rabban i and Massoud. For the Pakistani government, Hekmatyar was no longer as 
important. Pakistan now lacked a government in Afghanistan that wou ld be receptive to 
settling the ongoing Pakistan-Afghanistan border dispute. Nevertheless, Massoud would 
not aid Pakistan in its regional ambitions and so they ultimately supported Hekmatyar in 
opposition to the Rabbani government that Massoud supp01ied.54 
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The fragmentation deepened in 1994 with multiple groups vying for power, 
s imultaneously desiring peace in Afghanistan but preoccupied with other games. 55 The 
continuing vio lence within the state angered Afghanistan's neighbors, particularly 
Pakistan, as it sought more influence in central Asia. Fai lure on the part of Hekmatyar to 
do what the lSI expected of him, prompted Pakistan to create a new surrogate force - the 
Tali ban. The time was ripe for a new power to come in and take control. The ultra-
orthodox Sunni Islamic militia of young Pashtuns, the Tali ban, seized this opportunity. 
In contrast to the chaos and lawlessness of the civil war under the Mujaheddin, 
the Tal iban were able to restore order to most of the country, thereby meeting with much 
early acceptance. By March 1995, the Taliban controlled one-thi rd of Afghanistan and 
were on the outskirts of Kabul. In retaliation, Massoud formed an anti-Taliban a ll iance 
wh ich brought together powerful warlords and their forces, such as Dostum and Ismail 
Khan. Around 1996 he created the Jabhi-e Mutahid-e Islami bara-e Nej ati Afghanistan 
(the United Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan) or what Pakistan dubbed the Northern 
A lli ance. 56 
The Taliban ' s greatest public relations success was abruptly ending the chaos and 
misery of the civil war period, with the promise of peace. It was for this reason that they 
gained support. However, their conservative interpretation of Shariah Law, based on 
Sunni Islam, was unfavorable to many less traditional Afghans. Nevertheless, the 
Taliban continued to control more and more of the country.57 The movement was strong 
with its Pakistani backing, powerful weaponry, fund ing, and training. Pakistan, with the 
support of Saudi Arabia and the approval of the United States, was responsible for the 
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support and maintenance of the Tali ban. On the other side, India, Iran, Russia, 
Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan supported the Northern Alliance. By early 2001, the Taliban 
controll ed ninety to ninety-seven percent of the country. 
2.3 Tlte Current Crisis- Terrorism, the Taliban, and al-Qa'ida 
The Taliban had begun as a spontaneous group in Kandahar around early 1994. 
Its members were reli gious students who felt outrage at the Mujaheddin leaders fighting 
for power within the city. They decided to take action to end what they viewed as corrupt 
practices, drawing on Islam as a justification for their intervention. Their ideology likely 
comes from the Islamic madrasahs in refugee camps, where Islam is taught on the basis 
of the Qur' an. This has proven to be a fertile ground for recruits. 58 There are many such 
camps along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border and this is a cmTent issue of much debate. 
Madrasahs are religious schools that educate millions of students in the Muslim world 
and they have faced much criticism as the breeding ground for terrorism. Some Pakistani 
madrasahs served as de facto training grounds for jihadists fighting the Soviet occupation 
of Afghanistan in the 1980s. Many of these soldiers went on to fight in later campaigns 
and some of the schools have helped forge the Tali ban and give support to Osama Bin 
Laden. 59 
The majority ofTaliban supporters are Pashtun and many have questioned 
whether support of the movement has been an effort to reassert Pashtun dominance in 
Afghanistan as it ex isted before the wars. The Taliban have insisted that the movement is 
open to anyone, although it is exclusively Sunni in its interpretation oflslam and 
therefore does not embrace the Shi 'a regions of the country. Within Afghanistan the 
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unni faith, of predominantly Pashtun membership, is at the top of a hierarchy. T he 
Shi 'a, residing in the centre of the state and Kabul , who belong to the Hazara ethnic 
group, are at the bottom.60 The absolute leader of the Taliban is Mullah Mohammad 
Omar who has been given the religious title of"Leader of the Faithful." He is a Pashtun 
fro m the south and this may be part of the Pashtun attraction to the Taliban.61 The 
objectives of the Taliban have much to do with their dissatisfaction with the power 
exercised by the Mujaheddin in Afghanistan and the belief that their rule by strict lslamic 
practice would be better suited for the population.62 The aim of the Taliban was and is 
the purification of Afghanistan alone, to free it from the Mujaheddin and establish an 
Is lamic slate based on Shariah Law. They saw the ousted government as having fa iled to 
ad here to proper Islamic standards. Replacement by the Taliban was seen as justifiable. 
It was the forces of al-Qa' ida, evo lving out of select Mujaheddin groups, who 
took advantage of the Taliban to entrench their position within the country, in a new 
vio lent, anti-Western form . Many of these fighters were organized by Osama Bin Laden, 
who had come from Saudi Arabia to wage jihad in Afghanistan at the beginning of the 
1980s and had been a deputy in the Mujaheddin Service Office.63 But Bin Laden desired 
to ex pand his field of action to include the United States, perhaps under the influence of 
radical Egyptian Ayman al-Zawahiri. In 1987 he declared himself independent of the 
Mujaheddin Service and established al-Qa' ida to reflect his more radical principles.64 
Bi n Laden used these al-Qa' ida forces to fight the Soviets during their occupation of 
Afghani stan. Al-Qa' ida aided the Taliban and created a secure base for themselves, and 
in September 2001 they launched their most recent terrorist activiti es on the U.S. Tn 
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reta li ation, the United States and their allies, under the UN, invaded Afghanistan, 
launching a new phase of the never-ending internal war.65 The objective of ai-Qa' ida 
was to " radically change popular perceptions, in order to make the distinction between 
Mus! ims and non-Muslims a central element in political mobil ization, leading in tum to a 
di minution of Western influence in the Islamic world."66 Seen from this perspective it 
was necessary that the attack be extravagant to provoke anti-Muslim sentiment in the 
West. The considerable gap between the Muslim and the Westem world seems proof that 
this objective was successful. 
T he attacks of 11 September 200 l were not immediately seen in Afghani stan as a 
major event. The population, especially in the rural areas, were preoccupied with another 
crisis - drought.67 The Taliban continued to control most of the country wi th little 
opposition. The regime had indeed become more radicalized but Bin Laden's role in 
domestic politics was limited. There were significant ideological differences separating 
him from the Taliban and he was looked upon with hostility and disgust by many who 
beli ev d he would not hesitate to sacrifice them for his greater objective.68 
However, for Afghanistan, war began when the first American bombs were 
dropped on the country as the U.S. began its attack on the Taliban . It took a few months 
before there were any observable results from the Western attack. Therefore the United 
States changed their strategy toward giving greater support to the Northern A lliance. The 
campaign with this assistance lasted nine weeks. The use of proxy fighters from the 
orthern Alliance had clear advantages. It enabled the Americans to conduct bombing 
and dispatch commandos with limited numbers of conventional forces. The bulk of 
37 
ground fighting was conducted by the Afghan allies themselves, for they knew the terrain 
the best. Us ing the Northern Alliance also reduced the number of troops having to be 
sent overseas (at that time) and American casualti es. The lower the number of casualties, 
the more likely it was the American public would support the war. 69 The loss of the 
North to the Americans and the Alliance only led to more defeats for the Taliban. In 
short, the events of 11 September 2001 were the begi1ming of the end for the Taliban. 
The U.S. demanded that the group hand over Osama Bin Laden, but they refused to expel 
him from their ranks. The Taliban waged a conventional war with the opposition instead 
or using guerrilla tactics and they were highly dependent on Pakistan and the ISl for 
military strategy. As a result of the strength of American bombing campaigns and the 
ass istance of the Northern Alliance, the Taliban military structure eventually collapsed. 
T hi s co llapse of the military ultimately brought down the Taliban and without an y 
po litical or social challenge.70 
The Tal iban was definitively defeated by the first week of December 2001.7 1 But 
the co llapse ofthe Taliban regime gave rise to a resurgence of locally-based power, 
i nclependent of the Kabul government. This power was in the hands of local warlords and 
the ir armies, and others linked to the Mujahedclin. As well, a "neo-Taliban" continued to 
contro l Pashtun territory and al-Qa'ida fo und a social base and sanctuary on the 
Arghani stan-Pakistan border. 
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2.4 After the War- The Bonn Agreement 
After the fall of the Taliban, the international community and the U nited Nations 
worked quickl y to bring together the factions and their leadership who were di viding the 
coun try into power-sharing ammgements. The Northern Alliance warlo rd leaders wanted 
a hold on power, as did various ethnic groups. These efforts culminated in the Bonn 
Agreement of December 2001. 
The Bonn Agreement was a framework fo r the transformation of the Afghan 
po li tical system and it paved the way fo r the establishment of an Afghanistan Interim 
Authori ty. The leadership of this authority went to Hamid Karzai, a Pashtun, whose 
appointment was to give legitimacy to the authority in the eyes of Pashtun people. 
However, there continued to be debate over representation by members of other ethnic 
groups. The Taliban were also excluded. The Bonn Agreement provided fo r the 
convening of a nationwide Loya Jirga (National Assembly). Thi s body would transfer 
the in terim administration 's authori ty to the Afghanistan Transitional Authority.72 
Besides beginning the process for creating a legitimate governing body fo r Afghanistan, 
the Bonn Agreem ent also attempted to address the volatile security situation of the 
country. First, it required that all Mujaheddin and armed forces would come under the 
command and control of the interim authori ty and be reorganized. Second, the 
international community would be asked for ass istance in forming and training a new 
national army. Third, the agreem ent requested the UN Security Council establi sh a fo rce 
to help maintain security in Kabul and surrounding areas. Finally, the Bonn part icipants 
would remove forces from wherever this new UN security force was deployed.73 
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The results of the Bonn Agreement were mixed. On the positive side, 
Afghanistan was relatively peaceful (at that time). However, it was a fragile peace and 
many of the agreement's provisions were fairly unrealistic. In the post-Bonn 
environment, armed warlords and militias sti ll played a significant role in the country, 
particularly in the countryside and the Taliban were and are still resisting. The provision 
that all armed forces and am1ed groups wou ld come under the command of the Interim 
Authority, was unlikely given their desire to retain power. Afghanistan also remained 
subject to extensive foreign involvement in its internal affairs. There was, and still is, a 
s ignificant power vacuum. While the idea of the Loya Jirga held much promise for the 
country and brought some moderate semblance of legitimacy to the Afghan political 
process, it failed in many aspects as well. The opporttmity to assist civilian leadership, 
promote democratic expression and draw authority away from the warlords was quashed. 
Preoccupation with establishing short-tem1 stability led many Afghan leaders and 
international decision-makers to appease undemocratic sectarian demands.74 
Nevertheless, in 2004 elections were held in Afghanistan and Hamid Karzai was 
elected President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. He then faced the difftcult task 
o f choosing a cab inet, havi ng to satisfy powerful factions, including his main opponents 
from the election campaign, as well as his own tribal and regional supporters. With so 
many disparate groups in the country, Karzai ' s task was a difficult one.75 Despite all of 
these difficulties, the U.S. supported the Bonn Agreement as visible proof it was trying to 
address the issues in the country, but it really did little to answer specific questions on 
how to proceed with the reconstruction of Afghanistan. 
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With international military and economic aid, Afghanistan met the benchmarks of 
the Bonn Agreement, which was officiall y concluded with the inauguration of the new 
at iona l Assembly in December 2005 . T he new government would prove to have and 
interesting future ahead of it as former Tali ban leaders rubbed shoulders with their 
Northern Alliance enemies, women vied for a voice in politics alongside Muslim 
lundamentalists, and Conununists saw themselves next to Western-educated 
intellectuals. 76 Whi le the Bonn process had come to an end, Afghanistan still had a long 
way to go before it would become "a self-governing state with functioning institutions 
and a level of development that could start ranking with even the poorest of other lesser 
I I d . . A . , 77 c eve ope countnes m s1a. 
In early 2006, President Karzai and other international leaders convened in 
London and issued the Afghanistan Compact, setting forth both the international 
community' s commitment to Afghanistan and Afghanistan's commitment to 
statebuilding and reform for the following five years. The Compact provides a strategy 
lor building an effective, accountable state in Afghanistan, with targets for improvements 
in secu rity, governance, and development, including measures for reducing the narcotics 
economy and promoting regional cooperation. The compact goes beyond the usual realm 
olpoverty reduction and addresses Afghanistan's short-to-medium term challenges as 
much as is possible for such an agreement. Its principal recommendation is that all 
stakeholders f·uJly fund and implement the Compact and the Afghanistan National 
Development Strategy (ANDS).78 With respect to the war and security concerns, utmost 
in many Afghans minds, the Compact addresses the security situation and how security 
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measures should be carried out. In 2006, NATO troops took over the leadership of 
military operations in the South and in October of that year took control of the entirety of 
Afghanistan. Since the beginning of military operations in the country, both the US- led 
coali tion and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) have operated w ith a 
' li ght footprint,' placing the onus of the reconstruction burden on Afghans themselves. 
However, this has proven inadequate for providing security to the troubled nation. In 
practi ce, the li ght-footprint approach has amounted to "nation-building lite" or nation-
building without sufficient resources.7c> T here has been a general lack of coordination 
between the di fferent forces and keeping Afghan regional commanders in line has been a 
challenge. When NATO came on board as leader of the ISAF it worked to get Provincial 
Reconstruction Teams (PRT) underway to reconstruct the country while war was 
ongoing. But insurgency has increased since 2006. Indeed, suicide bombings and more 
ru thl ess tactics have been utilized by insurgents w ithin the country, often o ri ginat ing in 
Pakistan. U.S. and Afghan government casualties caused by the insurgency were higher 
in 2005 than any other year and the lethali ty of attacks has also increased. 80 
A lthough Afghani stan has made some progress since Bom1, in 2006, the security 
situation in the country had deteriorated signifi cantly and Afghans appear to be losing 
faith in the internati onal community' s ability to ass ist them. The implementation of the 
goals outlined at the Bonn conference regarding governance, reconciliation and 
ass istance in Afghanistan has proven to be slow and unsuccessful in some areas, further 
weakening the govermnent's overall credibility. There is a lack of capacity in the 
j ud iciary and in public administration, as well as a great inability on the part of the 
42 
government to achieve broad representation of ethnic and social groups critical to the 
achievement of national unity and reconciliation. 81 All ofthese problems are exacerbated 
by the troublesome behavior of regional and factional warlords, and the illegal drug trade. 
This has been further compounded by the slow pace of economic reconstruction linked 
to insufficient intemational funding and growing security problems. In this shaky 
environment, the Taliban, who were never a part of the Bonn process have begun 
. tl2 
regrouping. 
It is like ly that disenchanted Taliban and al-Qa'ida feel left out of the 
reconstruction process and bitter about their lack of inclusion within the new government. 
Having never entirely been defeated they have regrouped on the Afghanistan-Pakistan 
border. Thi s ' neo-Taliban ' is not without support. The Pashtun populations in both 
Afghani stan and Pakistan, who likewise feel only a minimal part in reconstruction, feel 
the Taliban may have something to offer. This decision to ignore the Taliban by the new 
Afghan government and the international community has tarnished the reconstruction 
process. Security and reconstruction difficulties have prevented sufficient progress in the 
areas of governance reform to promote public order and economic progress. By the fall 
2006, these difficulti es had led to an increasingly deteriorated situation, particularly in 
predominantly Pashtun areas of the South. This is a trend which should be of great 
concern to the Afghan govenm1ent and the intemational community involved in 
reconstruction efforts. 83 
Knowledge of the history of conflict in Afghanistan is important for those 
invo lved in reconstruction of the state. The background identifies the players in the 
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" multiple games," i.e. the Taliban, the warlords, Mujaheddin, ethnic groups, and 
Pakistan. It also helps the observer to understand how events in the past influence the 
c hoices or actors in th future nested games, and why these choices and strategies may 
not be seen as optimal by the West. Awareness of the history of conflict gives an early 
understanding of the stakes ofthe game for those intervening before they themselves are 
introduced to the meta-game. 
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Chapter Three- Games in the Principal Arena: Liberal-Democratic Ambitions 
" . .. The survival of liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success of liberty in 
other lands. The best hope for peace in our world is the expansion of freedom in all the 
world ."84 - George W. Bush, 2006 
Over the past several decades, the hegemonic forces of economic liberali zation, 
g loba l capitalism and democratization have shaped the context with which nation-states 
govern. These ideas have converged into a common model which developed states, 
particu larly the United States, use to reconstruct countries that are failing or have drifted 
away from a democratic institutions and processes. Defeating the Taliban has been the 
U.S. strategy from the start. After ousting the Taliban from power and weakening al-
Qa'ida's operations in Afghanistan, the United States was expected to play a central ro le 
in the country's reconstruction. President Bush pledged to the Afghan people that the 
U.S. would take on a Marshall Plan-like effort to rebuild the country. Most Afghans 
hoped that the Americans would be guarantors of a more prosperous, peaceful , and 
promising future. Close inspection ofpost-9/11 reconstruction efforts are showing that 
the country has fallen short of these expectations. 
Democratic governance with its elections, accountability and integrity, conflict 
resolution, and consensus building, is seen as the ideal fonn of governance by the 
Western world. Such a model addresses social equity and inclusiveness, diversity, 
legitimacy, and protection.85 However, Afghan and international perspectives and key 
interests have not always been harmonious. The stabilization efforts have attempted to 
acknowledge ethno-political and Afghan agendas in combination with the international 
agenda, in an ambitious, centralizing state-building agenda under a "l ight footp rint" 
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international presence. However, lack of agreement on one common poli tical strategy has 
resul ted in the favo ring of elections and new institutions - regardless of how fragi le and 
unprepared - over a holistic vision fo r state-building in the country.86 This perception of 
democracy and libera l norms has been viewed by the Western interveners, headed by the 
United States, as an ideal to be implemented and enforced with in Afghani stan. Ottaway 
and Lieven express great concern with such an approach, as the U.S. has" . . . embarked on 
ambi t ious proj ects to reconstruct the country in the image of a modern secu lar, 
mu lti ethnic, and democratic state. None of these approaches should be used in 
Afghani stan."87 M any analysts expect democracy promotion to fai l. From an outsider 
perspecti ve, Afghanistan seems an unlikely candidate for successful democratization. 
While it is developing a functioning political system, it does not possess the most basic of 
state institutions that are prerequi sites fo r any stable political regime, let alone 
representati ve institutions and rule of law necessary fo r successful democratization. The 
onl y functioning industry in Afghanistan is the drug trade and the country is one of the 
most poverty-stricken on earth. It is divided by deep antagonisms am ong members o f 
d ifferent ethnic, triba l and religious groups, and it is dominated by regional warlords. It 
is not surpri sing that the attempt to develop liberal democracy in Afghan istan has be n 
labeled an " impossible fantasy."88 Wh ile the game here is complex with many players 
and many arenas, the West, however, sees only one game of defeating the Taliban and 
insta lling democracy. W hat they want is the establ ishment of democracy in Afghani stan 
making it a more ' fri endly' country. Therefore they have only one strategy. The reality 
is that there should be many. Establishing democracy is not possible while ignoring 
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nested games and multiple arenas within the larger fTamework. The West sees only one 
game in the principal arena - between themselves and the central government led by 
Karzai . However, there are many other actors. These are very ambitious plans by the 
West to tum a war-hardened, economically ravaged, and deeply divided country into a 
modern democratic state. Success in this endeavor is unlikely. 
3.1 American Ambitions in Afghanistan- Tlte Bush Doctrine 
The "Bush Doctrine," the popular name given to a set of policies introduced by 
President Bush in a speech given in 2002, outlining a new phase in U.S. foreign policy 
that would place greater emphasis on military pre-emption, military superiority, unilateral 
action, and a commitment to extending democracy, liberty and security to most parts of 
the g lobe. The policy was fom1alized in The National Security Strategy of the United 
States of Alllerica .89 The Bush Doctrine marked a significant departure from the Cold 
War policies of deterrence and containment. The Security Strategy has four components : 
a strong belief in the importance of a state ' s domestic regime in deciding its forei gn 
po licy, and the related idea that the time is ripe to transform international politics; th 
perception of great threats to national interest, which can be usurped only by intense use 
o f force; a wi llingness to act unilaterally if necessary; and an overTiding sense that peace 
and stability require the United States to asseti its primacy in world politics.90 The 
National Security Strategy opens with the statement that there is one " ... sing le 
sustainable model for national success: freedom, democracy, and free enterprise." The 
spread of these values makes "the world not just safer but better." There is the view that 
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a world characterized by democracy, economic opermess, and individualism is not only 
good for America, but it is best for others.91 
Bush and his government are realists in the large role they see fo r force in 
international politics. Realists believe that states find themselves in an anarchic system in 
which security cannot be taken for granted. It is therefore rational to compete for power 
and security. in a situation where security is not guaranteed, force, pre-emption, and 
military force may be utilized.92 They are also liberals in their beliefs about what drives 
forei gn policy. America has continuously pushed the liberal ideals of rule of law, ri ghts, 
equality, and democracy. 93 The foreign policy presented by the U.S. in the Bush 
Doctrine is essentially an extension of its basic values. 
At the release ofthe security strategy there was significant criticism of the new 
foreign policies being articulated by the United States. Many saw the Bush Doctrine as 
an imperial doctrine; their plan " is for the United States to rule the world. The overt 
theme is unilateralism, but it is ultimately a story of d01nination."94 
Besides its emphasis on military power, military superiority and military pre-
emption, the Bush security document emphasizes the ever-impor1ant American values of 
freedom and democracy. "The significance of the document resides in its capacity to link 
some of the most familiar themes in American history - freedom, democracy and 
entrepreneurship - to new perceptions of threat and a new inclination to exercise 
power."'>S However, these values are tough to export and often carmot be at all. The goal 
of exporting and establishing democracy is ultimately a democratized world but this does 
not mean exporting American style democracy. There are also many problems with 
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trying to export democracy in the midst of war. Democracy is un I ike I y to be imposed on 
a country at the point of a gun or in the troubled times of a war of aggression, even one 
launched in the name of regime change and freedom. "The lex humana in whose name 
internationalism and global democracy must be pursued will not be secured by trying to 
ex port Lex Americana - America's own unique experience with law and democracy."96 
Democracy' s most important virtue is patience. Tt is a slow-paced and thorough process 
that should be executed carefully. Nevertheless, many Americans and other outsiders to 
nedgling democracies seem to think that other people in cultures new to democracy 
should achieve in a few months what it took Americans and other mature democracies 
centuri es to secure. They allow no time for mistakes and the many intricate and 
intertw ined processes that develop a strong democracy.97 
Apart from the multiple roadblocks to democratization within Afghanistan, efforts 
are unlikely to be successful due to the nature of U.S. military interventions. ot only do 
they infringe upon sovereignty and ignore the need for more internal involvement, the 
United States has also intervened to advance its material interests. The U.S . entered the 
war in Afghanistan to defeat the terrorists who attacked the World Trade Center and the 
Pentagon. It remains there to ensure that the country will not reem erge as a breeding 
ground fo r anti -American terrorists. Thus, one of the most crucial reconstruction tasks in 
the country is to construct a state governed by leaders who will serve the materia l 
interests of the U.S . and guarantee its security. Often democracy promotion is pursued in 
an effort to legitimate interventions in the eyes of international liberal alli es, within the 
country where the United States has intervened, and to the domestic audience at home.9R 
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The promotion of democracy is one ofthe most important tools that policymakers use to 
transcend contradictions involved in being a liberal power. Democracy promotion allows 
more aggressive foreign policy endeavors to appear more legitimate. 
The U.S. strategy of the Bush Doctrine is the overall strategy of the Western alli es 
in Afghanistan . The bottom line, however, is that this strategy is not conducive to 
so lvi ng a game with nested components. 
3.2 Western Influence in tlte Bonn Agreement and the Afghanistan Compact 
The Bonn Agreement, officially the Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in 
1!/ghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment of Permanent Government Institutions, was 
the initial series of agreements intended to re-create the state of Afghanistan following 
911 1. The liberal-democratic vision is evident within the agreement even if not explicitly 
stated. Under the General Provisions, article four states that" ... a fully representative 
government be elected through free and fair elections." Article four under Final 
Provisions speaks of the emergency Loy a Jirga and the insurance of "participation of 
women as well as equitable representation of all ethnic and religious communities."99 
The components of democratic reconstruction include an agreement on a new permanent 
political system; elections as soon as possible; and a multiethnic, secular, and democratic 
dimension, all ofwhich are purported in the Bonn Agreement, regardless of whether this 
has any basis in local tradition, or if the inhabitants want it. Support for free and fair 
e lections in Afghanistan has become a grand strategic vision; liberal democracy is the 
centra l focus. The United States decided early on that Hamid Karzai would be its 
preferred candidate to rule Afghanistan. The U.S. supp01ied his selection as interim 
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leader at the Bonn Summit. Some groups in the first Loya J irga pushed to select another 
candidate, the fom1er King, Zahir Shah, as new chief executive in 2002. However, a U.S. 
envoy intervened in the process and convinced the deposed king to decline the position, 
thus ensuring the success of the favored candidate to the U.S. - Karzai. As well , duri ng 
the constitutional Loya Jirga, the United States encouraged delegates to support a 
centra lized uni tary republic with a strong presidency, a system that would serve U.S. 
interests best if it could ensure its candidate was elected. Bonn presents the idea of an 
Alghan Loya Jirga with liberal Western e lections. 100 
Chri stopher Freeman further elaborates on the idea of Western democracy 
promotion but from the view that the West tri es to export its varie ty of secular democracy 
to Islamic society. He beli eves that the war on terrori sm can be seen as commensurate, 
though not exclusively, with a war on the Islamization of political units, particularly 
when they take a rejectionist stance to ' unjversal' Westem ideals like liberal democracy. 
Ex porting westem tradi tion through democrati zation and international administration has 
undermined the evo lution of the Afghan state.10 1 As discussed in the previous chapter, in 
Alghani stan, many people identify strong ly with different tribes, clans and groups, and 
maybe onl y weakl y with the state. Oftentimes, keeping the state together requires 
repressive power. The Taliban was the power to do just that. It a lso had legitimacy 
based on one common thread between all di fferent parties - Islamic tradi tion. Since 
intervention, the country is becoming more fragmented as the interveners pursue their 
ideals. Since Bonn, Afghanistan is formally know n as the Islamic Republic of 
l~{?hanistan. However, the U.S. for a variety of hi storical reasons wishes to " play down" 
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the importance oflslam. Since 9/ ll , many Islamic states have been labeled 'rogue' by 
the U.S. Initiatives to abolish 'rogue' Islamic states and transform them into secular 
polities will not help successfully reconstruct Islamic countries like Afghanistan. It is 
more like ly to exacerbate tensions because it radicalizes and adds legitimacy to Islamic 
movements. Dismissal of Islamism as a state-building ideology has been a longstanding 
problem. 102 The creation of an Islamic central authority can prevent the fragmentation of 
the government and society because of its play on common values and goals and the 
attachment of these to the state. Trying to shift a society into a system which the 
constituent parts are not willingly organizing themselves can cause it to snap vio]ently. 103 
T here is a belief that liberal democracy is the proven route to peace, prosperity and social 
justice. Nonetheless, Islam no more prohibits the development of democracy than 
secularism assures it. 
The Bonn Agreement states that the interim administration shall function " in 
accordance with Islamic principles, international standards, the rule of law, and Afghan 
legal traditions." 104 If one breaks down this statement there are two important phrases 
according to Freeman, " international standards" and "rule of law" - Western imports 
sandwiched between the "allure of national expressions of ownership over the juridical 
model." 105 [slamic principles are weakened when international standards are enforced. 
T he recommended return to the legal system that was in place under Taliban rule, shows 
a commitment to building a state with a legal system similar to the West, and it also 
disregards the "corruption and cronyism" inherent in such a system due to its 
inappropriateness for the political and social culture of Afghanistan. 106 
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There are two misconstrued ideas held by the Westem powers surrounding 
Afghanistan. Firstly, that it was a de facto fai led state at the time of intervention. And 
second, that it needs to be rebuilt in the image of a secular, liberal-democratic state -
Is lam ism was not the source of its political dysfunction. It is important not to disregard 
the humanitarian pursuits of intervention or to deny the harsh nature of the Tali ban 
regime, but Islam offers a number of benefits in rebuilding Afghanistan. 107 Freeman 
gives six points about Islam that might be considered with respect to the reconstruction 
e fforts in Afghanistan. First, he argues that "politicized Islam" is an alternative to failed 
attempts at other forms of governance, in the search for political stabi lity and 
development. Given that Afghans are not receptive to Western style government, a 
strong Is lamic party might have more support. Second, while Islamic fundamentalism 
may be seen as troublesome by most Western observers, it may indeed be a necessary 
step in forging a lasting state foundation. The creation of an Islamic central authority can 
prevent the disintegration and fragmentation of the state. Third, Islam is a shared identity 
for many people. Divisions within Islam should discourage the formation of an Islamic 
bloc. Fourth, shifting a society into a model that does not come naturally to it can be far 
more problematic than the existing situation. Fifth, the processes of democratization must 
develop internally. Sixth, the transition oflslamic states and societies towards greater 
liberalism is best aided through inclusion in the international system, not through 
isolation and exclusion. 108 
The point here is that if the United States or any other intervening power wants 
to promote democratization as part of a preventative democracy strategy aimed at 
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debilitating terrorism within Islamic states, they will have to proceed with greater 
patience, and with an understanding that the characteristics of tolerance and pluralism are 
intended" ... not just to protect the state from religion but to protect religion from the 
state . .. libera ls worry that religion will undem1ine their freedoms, but the religious 
wonder whether they themselves will be tolerated by those who call themselves free. " 109 
There are currentl y too many parties attempting to govern political developments in the 
country. 
Like the Bonn Agreement, The Afghanistan Compact of2006, as di scussed in the 
previous chapter, is drafted along similar lines and also seems to support the Western 
gam e. Its three 'critical and interdependent areas or pillars of activity' are "1) Security 2) 
Governance, Rule of Law, and Human Rights, and 3) Economic and Social 
Development." 110 The agreement, drafted by numerous countries and groups including 
the U.S., Canada, Britain, NATO, and the UN, calls for "democratic governance and the 
protection of human ri ghts [as the] comerstone of sustainable political progress in 
Afghani stan." 111 The motivation behind the intervention into Afghanistan has not 
changed s ince Bonn was created in 200 1. It is unlikely one will see an evaluation based 
on the political and social realities of Afghanistan anytime soon. As the leading 
international power in Afghanistan, the National Security Strategy of the United States of 
America, puts it most clearly, "America must stand firmly for the non-negotiable 
demands of human dignity: the rule of law; limits on absolute power of the state; free 
speech; freedom of worship; equal justice; respect for women; religious and ethnic 
tol erance .. . " The U.S. will "actively work to bring the hope of democracy, development, 
54 
rree mark ts, and free trade to every corner of the world." 11 2 Today's ideo logues see a 
model society in the United States that is a combination of law, liberal freedoms, 
competitive private enterprise, and regular, contested elections with universal suffrage; 
they strive to remake the world in this image of 'free society.' 11 3 
Democracy promotion by outside observers has many limitations, and after initial 
stages of building democratic legitimacy - especially in war-tom societies such as 
Afghanistan 's where mistrust is pat1icularly acute - must be driven from within a 
country. Too much foreign involvement in the process of democratization makes 
democracy seem foreign-led, un-lslamic, and therefore un-Afghan in the eyes of Afghan 
people. Democratization must be carefully planned and feature great internal input. 114 
The United States is trying to fulfill its foreign policy imperatives of ensuring national 
sec urity while promoting democracy and free trade; liberal internationalists want to halt 
terrorism and continue democratization under the auspices of the United Nations; local 
political stakeholders - warlords and factional leaders - are trying to maximize their 
power in the new structure; and many ordinary Afghans want peace but continue their 
loyalty to clans and tribes. 11 5 Divergent agendas and strategies are culminating in a sub-
optimal outcome to the game of the West. 
Democracy, while rightly popular, will not work for everyone in its Western 
manifestation. There are also nested games and di ffering strategies to be considered (the 
subject of the next chapter) . Ridding a state of terrorists, even a state reluctant to pursue 
this goal, can remove one obstacle from the process of democracy building and is a 
justifi cation for counter-terrorist preventive strikes. But to rid a state of its sovereign 
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regime (like the Taliban in Afghanistan), however repressive and brutal that regime may 
be, is likely to create more obstacles rather than facilitate democracy building. And to 
ignore other actors and their games is poor strategy as well. This is a lesson that the U.S. 
government appears to be learning in Afghanistan and Iraq. Democracies are formed 
rrom the inside out and bottom up, not the other way around. This is how democracies 
should be formed and it is for this reason the process takes so long. This also suggests 
that the objective for those seeking a democratic world should not be "democracy" in the 
singular form, on the American model or otherwise, but "democracies" in the plural. 116 
Or ultimately, democracy may be impossible. The strategy of democracy building and 
the reality of games in multiple arenas are contradictory. As long as the West is unclear 
or whom the other actors are, their strategies, and their payoffs, the principal strategy of 
democratization will not have an optimal outcome. 
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------------------------------------- -----
Chapter Four- Introducing the Nested Games: Restricting Western Success 
Drawing on game theory, each weak and failed state wil l be characterized by a 
unique set of nested games that inhibits implementation of policy by the internationa l 
community and simultaneously precludes the reso lution of the principal gam e. The 
specifi c nature of these multiple smaller games will vary from place to place. Some may 
limit the ability to establish central liberal-democratic political institutions, while others 
may be conducive and supportive of such orders. 11 7 In the case of Afghanistan, the 
nested games are limiting this optimal achievement and are a lso ensw·ing that the liberal-
democratic game of the West is probably not the right answer for Afghanistan. There are 
five particularly significant nested games that are proving to be impediments to 
reconstruction efforts within Afghanistan. These factors are long-tenn realities of the 
country and w ill have to be addressed. They are not problems to be glossed over in the 
West's desire to create a liberal-democratic state. 
The nested games consist of many actors. The first and foremost nested game 
re lates to the reality that the Taliban and ai-Qa'ida groups are still very active with in the 
country. However, they have been excluded since the very begi1ming of reconstruction in 
a II processes for refmmi ng the country and government. The Bonn Agreement of 200 I 
was s igned by four non-Tali ban groups. The Taliban is often very strongly equated with 
a l-Qa ' ida and terrorism. They are indeed zealous extremists and the beliefs they 
advocate are often at odds with the beliefs of many Afghans, and many use v iolence to 
achieve political ends. Despite this, there are many Pashtun people who support the 
group. They do this for a variety of reasons: the desire for stability and order, 
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disillusionment with warlords, discouragement at the slow pace of development, dislike 
o f outs iders, a desire for Pashtun and not non-Pashtun leadership, distrust of Northern 
Alli ance dominance, and so forth. 118 The Taliban and its support base are part of the 
nested game fran1ework in Afghani stan. [n excluding the Taliban from reconstruction 
efforts, the forei gn powers are only hurting their chances of success in the principal 
arena. S imultaneously, the Taliban are not a defeated foe as once believed. R ecent 
insurgency shows the threat has not yet died and a ' neo-Taliban' is on the rise. 
A second nested game is the Pakistani influence in Afghanistan. Shared Pashtun 
background and culture is one of the greatest links between these two countries and 
Pakistan has supported the Taliban for many years. Pakistan has aspirations for greater 
power within the region and influence in Afghanistan has been a stepping stone in that 
d irection. The role of Pakistan is pivotal to the direction insurgency within Afghanistan 
will take. While the interveners are aware and concerned of the role that Pakistan is 
playing in the country, their efforts are focused primarily on the ground in Afghanistan, 
rather than involving themselves in serious talks with Pakistan and other neighbor 
governments. Nation and state building in Pakistan may derive benefits from vio lence, 
economic interest and state disarray in another country such as Afghanistan. Persistent 
meddling of neighboring powers is the primary reason so many warlords and ethnic 
fact ion leaders remain powerful. 
Concurrentl y, warlords and "conflict entrepreneurs" continue to have significant 
influence in Afghanistan; this is the third nested game. Many of the warlords in 
Afghani stan today come from the old Mujaheddin forces that fought the Soviet 
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occupation. While the tem1 "warlord" is a contested one, the United States Institute of 
Peace claims it denotes "an individual who exercises a combination of military, political , 
and economic power outside a constitutional or legal framework." 119 Regardless of the 
chaos in society, warlords still operate to their economic advantage. In pockets of society 
there is intense economic activity based on their actions. There has been a resurgence of 
warlords, in many places they are the only real power on the ground, and there is little 
chance that they will be displaced soon. They furnish whatever local government there 
is ; it is the warlords versus Kabul. 120 Warlords and regional commanders are turni ng to 
leadership roles in business and politics, which is promising, but most continue in 
organ ized crime, which seems logical, easy and profitable. The foundation of this 
organ ized crime is in the growing of opium poppies, the production of heroin from them, 
and the smuggling of heroin out of the country to regional and global markets. 12 1 
The drug economy and opium trade is a source of much conflict and the fou rth 
nested game. The narcotics trade provides financial resources to both warlords and 
commanders. There has been a failure on the part of the central govemment to control 
Lhe growth of poppy and the processing and transportation of opium. 122 In 2004, the si ze 
of the opium crop was 4200 tons - a figure that represents eighty-seven percent of the 
world total fo r the year. One tenth of the Afghan population is involved in growing 
opi um.123 The fast growth ofthis illicit economy is alarming. Until this economic 
mainstay of many Afghan people is put under control , the state will continue to be 
wreaked by internal struggles. 
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As well as these serious situations creating nested games within Afghanistan there 
arc also many other interacting relationships that cannot be ignored. Conflict between 
cthniciti es within Afghanistan is the final arena to be addressed. The Pashtun and non-
Pashtun rivalry is exceptionally strong, as well as conflicts between Sunni and Shia, 
traditionalists and urban eli tes, and rural versus urban populations. The urban, educated 
e lite were dependent on an externally-funded state sector, while the rural , illiterate 
popu lation depended on subsistence agriculture. While the origin of the current conflict 
may not be ethnic, "the politicization of ethnicity has bad a corrosive effect on the 
potential for national reconciliation."124 
Although Afghanistan is ethnically mixed, the Pashtw1 are the core ethnic group 
in the country. When the U.S. began Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001, they chose 
the Northern Alliance to serve as "shock troops," because they were from non-Pashtun 
populations. Even the election of Pashtun Karzai did not put fears in the Pashtun 
community to rest of domination by a coali tion of other groups. Since 2003, there has 
been a fear of alienation from the Karzai government and the intemational "Bonn 
Process." If the country's dominant ethnic group do not fee l they have a stake in the 
reconstruction process, those attacks may be a sign oflraq-like civil war to come. 125 The 
exclusion of certain groups from the new government and the dominance of other groups 
have exacerbated the ethnic tensions in the country. The ignorance of Islam has also 
posed a significant problem. Islam is in fact a unifying force within the state but neglect 
or its importance is only serving to create more friction. Nested games are not being 
understood nor approached appropriately. Equilibria achieved at the nested games level 
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is the actors' main concern . What this ultimately means for the principal arena game of 
the Western mission is failure. 
4.1 Enemies Undefeated: The Taliban and al-Qa 'ida 
When the United States and its alli es began their bombing campaign on 
Afghani stan in 2001 , they had one objective in mind: to defeat and eliminate those who 
perpetrated the heinous crimes on 11 September - al-Qa' ida and later the Taliban linked 
to them. What was intended to be a swift campaign to root out these enemies of the U.S. 
and the Western powers, however, has become a s ix year ordeal with minimal success 
and no sign of Bin Laden. While coalition forces did a significant job of eliminating 
much of al-Qa' ida and the Taliban from Afghanistan in the earl y days of the campaign, 
since 2006, the Taliban once in retreat, are on the offensive again. 
In the past year, a number of events have threatened the international effort in 
A[ghanistan. There have been continuous troubles in Southern Afghani stan but recentl y, 
the Paki stan-based, Taliban-led insurgency has become bolder and more lethal in the 
southern and eastem parts of the country, extending all the way to the outskirts of Kabul. 
T he Taliban have been showing increasing power and agility.126 In some areas, there is 
now a parallel Taliban state, and locals are increasingly tuming to Taliban-run courts, 
which are seen as more effective than the corrupt offi cial system. Suicide bombings, 
something unknown to Afghanistan until now, have recently created terror in Kabul and 
other areas, and they are spreading throughout Afghanistan. When the Bush 
admini stration overthrew the Tali ban after 911 1, it did so with a "light footprint." After a 
qui ck military campaign, it backed the UN effort to f01m a government and manage the 
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politi cal transition. It also helped form the ISAF to provide security to the country. 
However, beyond that, the U.S. and NATO have done little to bring together the 
neighboring regions in the effort to eradicate terrorism . The government has not garnered 
suffi c ient resources and legitimacy to secure its own territory and develop a geopoli tica l 
identi ty unthreatening to its neighbors - particularly Pakistan whose hand in Afghan 
po li tics and society is significant. Such an endeavor would have required more troops 
and greater emphasis on this facet of reconstruction. Too little of this has happened and 
Afghani stan and the international players are facing the consequences - the Taliban is on 
the ri se. 127 Failure in these endeavors is costing the West the meta-game. 
As di scussed in the history, the Taliban and al-Qa' ida are two separate groups -
both dangerous and both w ith violent behavior that needs to be halted . But it was ai-
Qa ' ida who planned and carri ed out the 11 September attacks in the United States. AI-
Qa' ida has a much more globalized agenda, aimed at a global Islamic jihad. It is 
somewhat of an imperi alist agenda but with Islam as its ideology. 128 The Tali ban 
leadership is comprised of ethnic Pashtun Afghans who grew up in refugee camps or 
madrassas in Paki stan during the Soviet occupation . The Taliban are an indigenous 
Afghan and Afghan-Pakistani organization with an agenda focused on governing 
Afghani stan. 12C) While much of al-Qa' ida was defeated in initial attacks, the Ta li ban 
continued with al-Qa' ida's violent tactics which plague the Western coalition . 
A lthough the initial U.S. bombing campaign after 9/ 11 had a signifi cant impact on 
the Taliban, diminishing their forces and halting their progress, thi s sta ll was only brief 
By the w inter of 2002-2003 there was no question that the Taliban had re-emerged. 
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Taliban guerrilla forces were carrying out attacks against the U.S. forces and their 
Atghan allies. After some months of reorganization, the Taliban had resumed its leading 
role in the Pashtun provinces and at the head of the movement there appeared to be no 
challenge to the southem Pashtun Taliban leader, Mullah Mohammad Omar' s, 
leadership. The strategy of the Taliban since 2003 has been to prevent the reconstruction 
o rthe central state, particularly in a manner envisioned by the West and the Karzai 
government. 130 An Afghanistan formed in the manner that the West envisions it, is an 
Atghanistan that excludes the Taliban and various other more militant groups. If a 
reconstructed Afghanistan allows the ignorance of the country's past leadership, as well 
as other groups who have support, it is not an Afghanistan that the Taliban would be 
wi lling to support. The payoffs are not significant enough. If the Taliban maintains this 
strategy for the duration of the war in Afghanistan, the West's strategy is unlikely to 
succeed. The Taliban are militarily strong and motivated. They do not want their 
country transfonned into the Western democratic image and they will not give up 
fighting the war. 
Since 2005, insurgent activities have also increased in lethality. Most of these 
new tactics mimic the deadly assault style of Iraqi fighters. Suicide bombings were once 
virtually non-existent in Afghanistan and now their use is on the rise. The use of 
lmprovised Explosive Devices (IEDs) has also led to many soldier deaths. On 4 July 
2007, six Canadian soldiers driving on the forces' most protected vehicle were killed 
when they hit an lED. Some have called this an "Iraqization" of the conflict. The 
Taliban's increasing use of such bombs is also taking its toll on civilians. "They're 
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attacki ng the weak, they're killing women, they're killing children, they're killing 
policemen. These are not the tactics of anything other than terrorists." 13 1 
The coalition in Afghanistan has disagreed on the status of the insurgency and 
what strategy to use against it. They seem unable to deal with the Taliban's strategy 
because of their principal arena concems. They cam1ot give the Tali ban a chair at the 
tab le given their overall goals; one of which is the Taliban's defeat. The U.S. especially 
counts on military force and eschews negotiations. However, successes in defeating the 
Taliban have been minimal. The United States has largely been depending on 
cooperation with Pakistan for action against Taliban and ai-Qa'ida bases, but their 
relations with Pakistan are another problem entirely. This will explained in the next 
section. The Afghan government also had some problems with the U.S., desiring them to 
reduce unpopular actions within Afghanistan, reduce unilateral actions, and instead focus 
on Pakistan. There is no real status of forces agreement between Afghanistan and the 
West, and there is mere ly a half-hearted counterinsurgency strategy, which is leading to 
tens ion between the two parties.132 Insurgents are gradually adapting to the current 
strategies of coalition forces. 
There are also questions about the effectiveness of the current Afghan 
government. An analysis of the situation in Afghanistan prepared for the Canadian 
government by the International Assessment Staff of the Privy Council Office warned 
that the country was becoming " two Afghanistans," with the situation in the South and 
West incessantly deteriorating and the position of President Karzai falling to a new low. 
The repoti draws attention to the unpredicted success of the Tali ban's new ruthless tactics 
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and the growth in financial assistance, recruitment, h·aining, equipping, and mora le of the 
Taliban.133 The Taliban are once again a f01midable foe. They are no longer a weakened 
and disparate group; it is questionable if they ever were. The gam e in the Tali ban vs. 
Arghanistan arena is a significant one. 
The current increase in violence is merely the latest chapter of Afghanistan ' s 
long- lasting war. "The war started as a Cold War ideological battle, morphed into a 
regional clash of ethnic factionalism, and became the center of the broader conflict 
between the West and a transnational Is lamist tenorist network." 134 Like the early 
chapters of thi s unfortunate story, the latest instalment shows no sign of resolution. The 
resurgence of the Taliban and al-Qa'ida is one of the nested games inhibiting a lasting 
so lution to this very troublesome and never-ending war. The Western powers wanted a 
qu ick victory to the war and initially it appeared as if this would be the case. However, it 
does not appear that the foreign interveners developed a strategy that considers the long-
term scenario or what might happen if thei r initial campaign failed. As well, they were 
d iverted to [raq. Although the U.S. never had a serious political approach, keeping troops 
and gu ns in Afghanistan could have had an effect. The Taliban were not included in 
Bonn talks and they are on the rise. There appear to be no payoffs for cooperating with 
the West in their gam e, which is why the Taliban strategy has been to undermine 
reconstruction, creating a sub-optimal outcome to thif; game. They are not getting what 
they want, they are not in power, and the country is still in chaos. It is unlikely that the 
Ta liban will win, but if the current trend in warfare continues m any more troops are 
goi ng to be needed and many more will probably di e, as well as Afghan civili ans. The 
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vio lent campaigns of the Tali ban need to be aborted but it must also be understood that 
they have significant support within the country. This is an issue that must be 
approached asserti vely, but w ith intelligence and consideration for the Afghan people, 
who can remember a life under the Taliban when things were less violent than they are 
now in 2007. 
4.2 Enemy or Ally: The Problem with Pakistan 
Pakistan is a decisive factor in the future of Afghanistan. Its influence on the 
troubled state has been considerable for some time. As Taliban insurgents and their ai-
Qa' ida a llies regain strength, they are threatening the reconstruction process and U.S .-Ied 
coa lition forces on Afghan soil. Pakistan-Afghanistan relations have been another 
casualty of the renewed violence. The resurgence ofthe Taliban movement and growing 
insurgency in the provinces on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border has generated tensions 
between Kabul and Islamabad. Both countries have begun accusing each other of 
meddling in their internal affairs. Afghanistan has put blame on Pakistan for fueling the 
insurgency in Afghanistan in order to destabilize the Afghan government and place a 
more cooperative government in Kabul instead.135 There have been accusations that 
groups within Pakistan have been training militants who are ending up within the Afghan 
state. 
The relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan has always been a precipitous 
one. This relationship has been tense for the past sixty years and the source of much 
regional instability. There has always been considerable debate around the territory 
surrounding the Durand Line- the poorly demarcated border between the two countri es. 
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Because the Durand Line artificially divides the Pashtun people, it continues to be a 
source of conflict between the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan.136 Many 
Pashtuns on the Afghan side refuse to accept the border. In fact, Kabul lays claim to 
Pashtun territory located on the Pakistani side of the line. Since 2001, this situation has 
persisted, only now Afghanistan is backed by the United States and the international 
community. As well , Pakistan is supposed to be a key ally in the war on terror. lt is a 
tricky dilemma for the Pakistan government. 137 Pakistan's involvement is one of the best 
examples of the two levels of the game being played in Afghanistan. They are part of the 
principal arena game as an ally of the West in efforts to eradicate terrorism. It would be 
to Pakistan ' s benefit to be viewed more favorably by the allies. Helping to execute one 
part of the Western strategy - eliminating the Tali ban - would place them in better 
standing internationally. However, Pakistan is also involved at the nested level. The 
terrori st training and activity occurring on their border with Afghanistan makes them an 
inhibitor of Western success. The efforts to rebuild Afghanistan and eradicate terrorists 
from the country will undoubtedly be an uphill battle without the concerted efforts of 
Pakistan but it may be hard for them to give themselves one hundred percent to the 
Western effort. 
Despite this, an even greater issue has formed as the war persists unceasingly -
insurgency. It is no longer a myth that the Taliban have been regrouping and attacking 
foreign troops as well as civilians. Insurgencies require logistical and support networks if 
they are to survive. The U.S. and Afghan governments, as well as many other 
international powers agree that, despite denial by the Pakistani government, the Taliban 
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have been enjoying "safe havens" there. Many warned that after the fall of the Taliban 
and ai-Qa'ida in Afghanistan, many would escape to Pakistan, through its loosely 
controlled border, and set up command centers - they have. They now contTollarge parts 
of the lawless tribal areas along the border. Continued sanctuary ofTaliban, jihadists, 
and other extremists in Pakistan, has Afghanistan particularly incensed. 138 The 
persistence of tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan should be a source of real 
concern for the West. 
Madrassas are teaching a particular type oflslam that interprets religion in a 
vio lent way, and they are seen as the breeding ground for Taliban and al-Qa' ida.139 [t has 
been estimated that there may be thousands of these schools along the Pakistan-
Afghanistan border. Students are most often recruited from the poor, children ofPashtun 
tribes, and Pakistani children who have no other source of schooling. The interpretation 
o fls lam in the madrassas produces future suicide bombers who will kill Afghan civi lians, 
other Muslims, and NATO forces. 140 The Afghan government has repeatedly accused 
Islamabad of not only sheltering the Taliban but also of helping them in order to make its 
presence felt. Many Afghans believe that the Taliban could not operate fi·om Pakistan 
wi thout official support. The insurgency has been taking place in a corridor along the 
border between the two countries but Pakistan claims it cannot control the border entirely 
on its own. 
Peshawar, Pakistan, the capital of the Notihwest Frontier and the birthplace of ai-
Qa ' ida in the 1980s, now hosts the Taliban. The Pakistan govenm1ent has little authority 
in such tribal areas and it is considered a " forbidden zone." The U.S . am1y has never 
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been there. The frontier, which encompasses five hundred miles and seven hundred 
districts, is being used by the Tali ban to regroup and rearm. 14 1 The tribal area of 
Waziristan has become the most notorious for harboring hundreds ofal-Qa'ida militants. 
Hundreds of Pakistani soldiers have already been killed there fighting local members of 
the Taliban and al-Qa'ida. When coalition forces moved into Afghanistan, this section of 
the border was kept open even though it was the most volatile. Both Taliban and forei gn 
fi ghters are welcomed into Waziristan by the local Taliban and the Pakistan govemment 
has not stopped volunteers or jihadists from leaving there and entering Afghanistan. 
Even after December 2005 as the resurgence was gaining momentum, Pakistani military 
and civilian authorities did nothing to stop the militants. 142 The President of Pakistan, 
General Pervez Musharraf, attempted to negotiate a deal with one of the al-Qa' ida 
commanders, Nek Mohammad; they were to lay down arms or get out, but the militants 
wanted to be compensated as well. It is suggested that the Pakistan goverm11ent paid the 
militants who in turn paid off their debt to ai-Qa'ida. Not surprisingly, the agreement 
broke down and the jihad continued. 143 
Since 2005, the militants are continuing to move from Waziristan to attack 
Afghanistan . .Jalaluddin Haqqani is considered responsible for the Taliban ' s current 
o ffensive and for introducing suicide bombing to the region . He possesses strong Arab 
connections for money and has deep roots in Saudi intelligence and the lSI. The lSI has 
done little to stem the tide of insurgency and many say that "the lSI is [only] on the lSl 's 
s ide." 144 In the town ofQuetta, a large Pakistani city on the border of the two countries 
and a place thought to be frequented by Mullah Omar, there are numerous madrassas for 
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training and the town has garnered itself the nickname "the factory," due to its record in 
churning out new Taliban by the hundreds.145 There is clearly a significant problem that 
has been developing for qui te some t ime in Pakistan. 
President Musharraf admits that the Tali ban have taken hold in areas near the 
Afghan border, but he defends his military's efforts in the region as well as his 
intelligence service ' s success in arresting ai-Qa' ida leaders. Not only Afghans have been 
complaining about lack of action by the Pakistan govemment; the Americans have been 
as well. Pakistan is considered to be an ally with the U.S. in this war. However, they are 
saying that Pakistan simply is not doing enough. To that Mushan·af had strong words, 
" Who the hell is doing anything ifPakistan is not doing enough?"146 
4.2.1 Afghanistan, Pakistan and the Pashtun Question 
As already noted, Afghanistan possesses a very significant population ofPashtun 
people; they have been the dominant group for many years. These people are spread over 
much of the country. There is also a large group ofPashtuns resid ing in Pakistan and thi s 
has become another source of conflict between the two countries in these vio lent times. 
The Pashtun question is an ethnic, political, and geopolitical problem. It is at the centre 
of Afghan nationalism but simultaneously has created nation-building problems fo r 
Pakistan. Both countries have had adversarial relations between their Pashtun 
populations and other ethnic groups. The return to Afghanistan ofthe Pashtun areas 
situated on the Pakistani sid of the Durand Line has always been and continues to be an 
Afghan demand. 147 A 1947 referendum offered no choice to the Pashtuns of the 
Northwest Frontier Province other than to become part of either India or Pakistan . 
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Afghanistan insists that this was not a fair vote as many Pashtun boycotted it and 
Afghanistan was not consulted. Afghans have continued to maintain this position 
regardless of who holds power in Kabul. Pakistan's position, naturally, has always been 
the opposite. They have always considered the Durand Line a valid international 
boundary. 148 Pakistan leaders thought that the ideology supported by the Taliban might 
transcend Afghan ethnic divisions that were causing instability within the country. Th is, 
however, did not happen. Neither would the Taliban accept the Durand Line and 
Afghanistan became even more ethnically stratified. These areas of debate remain 
sensitive issues in Afghanistan today. 
Some Pashtun groups are feeling excluded from the reconstruction process and 
for many, renouncing reunification of the Pashtuns would be to marginalize them. 14 9 The 
battle over the unification of Afghanistan and Pakistan Pashtun populations remains a 
major point of contention between the two countries today. 
4. 2. 2 Pakistan: Tying it Together 
Pakistan is a fickle ally, but the West seems hesitant to demand a diligent effort 
on the part of the Pakistani govenm1ent to stop the Tali ban. Pakistan is the key to 
advancing the regional development and stabi lity goals because of its proximity to 
Afghani stan and its understanding of the region.150 Stabilizing the region requires a 
comprehensive policy toward the Afghanistan-Pakistan relationship. The most 
immediate issues are the bases and support networks for the Taliban and al-Qa' ida on the 
Pakistan border. However, both Afghanistan and Pakistan w ill be unab le to reduce the 
vo lati lity ofthis situation without the assistance of the United States and other 
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international actors, to help them structure their relationship in a more cooperative 
direction. 151 To this point, however, there has been little headway made in creating a 
comprehensive strategy toward Pakistan with relation to Afghanistan, combating the 
Taliban, and the war on terror. In this dangerous setting, the U.S. and NATO's political 
and military leaders have neither a policy nor the capacity to manage the evolving 
internal trends in the Pakistan-Afghanistan centre of the war on terror. As well, their 
allies on the ground - Karzai and Mushanaf- are caught in internal conflicts that are 
radicaliz ing the politics of both countries and diminishing their options for bringing 
stability to the region. 152 Events in Pakistan not only affect the situation in Afghanistan, 
but they disrupt the stability of the entire region. The interaction of the Afghanistan-
Pakistan relationship with the India-Pakistan one has been the root cause of much of the 
regions problems for decades and threatens global security. If Pakistan is not dealt with 
appropri ately, conflict will be the reality of not only Afghanistan but future cooperation 
will be unlikely within the whole region. All of the problems lead to a convoluted 
strategy with respect to Pakistan. The West needs Islamabad as an ally but it has internal 
and regional preoccupations. It is hard for Pakistan to support Western strategy while 
a lso involved in the Afghanistan-Pakistan arena, leading once again to a sub-optimal 
outcome in the principal arena. If no steps are taken to deal with Pakistan in the near 
ruture, the weak relationship the two countries currently have will crumble and the war 
on terror will be prolonged well past the time any group of interveners would want to 
stay. 
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4.3 Government Instability and the Rule of Warlords 
Four years after the Bonn Accord it remains the case that much of Afghanistan is 
sti ll effectively governed by regional warlords. Hamid Karzai's central govemment's 
control remains tenuous outside ofKabul. Some observers claim that up to seventy-five 
percent of the country is controlled by warlords and regional leaders. 153 
Warlords can be particularly threatening when they exercise control over one or 
many distinct geographical regions. 154 In a properly functioning state, the government 
defines the legitimate sub-national territorial units. In Afghanistan, these units include 
th irty- two provinces. However, there are also hauzas, which are military zones the 
communist regime created in the 1980s. For the most part, the warlords operate from the 
/w uzas. 155 Since 11 September, the war on terror and the ousting of the Tali ban, the 
warlords have re-emerged. This is partially related to the American decision to support 
regional commanders (who could assist with U.S. military operations) with money and 
weapons, rather than supporting a central authority at the beginning of the campaign 
aga inst the Taliban. At the centre ofU.S. policy in Afghanistan, has been the 
empowerment of regional commanders and armed militias often with horrifying human 
rights records. This is another implication of the Westem strategy. With the desire for a 
quick defeat of the Taliban and the democratization of Afghanistan, the West has taken 
on these allies. In engaging their assistance, the U.S. ignored everything but their 
w illingness to fight in the interests of the United States. Engaging non-democratic allies 
in a pursuit for democracy has proven disastrous for a solution to the principal arena 
game. 
73 
As alluded to in chapter two, supported by the U.S. and its allies in the 1970s and 
1980s, the Mujaheddin were used to eliminate the Soviet occupiers. During their war 
with the Taliban in the 1990s, groups led by commanders Ahmed Shah Massoud, Ismail 
Khan, Abdul Rashid Dostum, and Karim Khalili united to fom1 the "Northern Alliance," 
or "Un ited Front." The Alliance leaders came from the major non-Pashtun ethnic groups 
Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras - in contrast to the mostly Pashtun Taliban. 156 In the 
beginning, the Northern Alliance was the only U.S. ally with forces on the ground in 
Afghanistan. For the first few weeks after 9/ll, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
executed a strategy in the South to find Pashtun warlords who would work with the U . . 
against the Taliban. The U.S. desired more Pashtun representation because the Taliban 
were predominantly Pashtun and they needed support from this major group. Secondly, 
Lhe Pashtuns are the largest ethnic group in the country and many would not support rule 
solely by the Northern Alliance without some of their own in a position of power. 157 The 
U.S. needed Pashtuns to replace the Taliban. The Pashtun who was most likely to unite 
his people against the Taliban was the fom1er king, Zahir Shah. The United States 
encouraged Zahir Shah to work with the Northern Alliance to generate an interim 
government to replace the Taliban. Above al l, the U.S. needed Zahir to legitimize their 
plan to overthrow the Taliban, especially among Pashtuns who had relative peace under 
the Taliban leaders.158 After he had served their purposes, Zahir ended up with nothing 
more than a fi gurehead ro le in the new government. 
While the Northern Alliance proved to be a useful ally in the initial ousting of the 
Tali ban in 2001, many Afghans, as well as Pakistanis, were skeptical about having them 
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in a power position because of the past ruthlessness they had shown.159 Memories of 
crimes at the hands of warlords were still fresh in many Afghans minds. Ultimately, the 
Northern Alliance quickly became a de facto government in Afghanistan with warlords 
wielding considerable power. In backing the Northern Alliance militarily and supporting 
their role at the Bonn Conference, Washington was primarily responsible for unleashing 
brutal warlords not only on the Taliban but also on the Afghan people. After the fall of 
the Tal i ban, Northern Alliance warlords obtained more power than the central 
government. For example, Ismail Kahn, powerful leader of one Northem Alliance group, 
controll ed one of the largest private armies in the country, which in 2002 was estimated 
as thirty thousand strong. At that time, this was twice the size of the Afghan National 
Army (A A). 160 
Afghanistan is a poverty-stricken country with few resources and no state 
monopoly on the use of force. Within the country economic power may be acquired in a 
rew ways: stealing and controlling land, stealing taxes at border checkpoints, stealing 
humanitarian aid, and trafficking narcotics. In post-Taliban Afghanistan, warlords in the 
central government and local commanders have been making use of all four methods. 
The warlords persist because the conditions that al low them to remain have not 
really changed. They also have a strong desire to retain power as long as is possible. The 
ractor that contributes most to the persistent existence of the warlords is the continuing 
weakness of the centre vis-a-vis the periphery. The central govemrnent is not as strong as 
it should be as the warlords maintain significant power. After the Taliban was defeated, 
the key source of power for the central govemment was international aid. The lack of 
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adeq uate outside funds to the government, has led the warlords to question the 
government's ability to provide basic public goods to its people. The warlords have 
therefore developed there own illegal means of garnering resources including smuggling 
and drug dealing. 161 The Jack of security structure outside of Kabul allows the warlords 
to conso lidate their power without it being checked. The warlords and their militias 
represent a great challenge to Afghanistan's rehabilitation, but a confrontational strategy 
toward them will likely lead to widespread fighting. 162 
Warlords are a problem, but in some cases, particularly in rural areas, they 
prov ide the only stability. The warlords provide two services for their constituents -
security and employment - which in turn generate support. Many claim that warlords 
have no place in the new politica l process because they do not exist in the political 
hierarchy; it is the provincial governors who are in charge. In reali ty, these governors are 
o !ten selected by warlords and clearly many Afghans support both. 163 Warlords are not 
goi ng to disappear any time in the near future; it m ay be useful to make a distinction 
between those who are militaristic and those who see the future of Afghanistan from a 
more political perspective. Warlords must be part of the process to determine how to 
deal with them, but they are a double-edged sword. Despite their service to Afghanistan, 
they and their armies are not yielding to the authority of the Karzai government. 
Ultimately, the central government wants to be the foremost authority in the country, but 
it risks provoking an uprising if it becomes too confrontational. 164 While there is no 
agreement as to how many armed men are outside the government, estimates are as high 
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as one hundred thousand and as low as thirty thousand .165 Both numbers are significant 
and a cause for concern. 
In 2007, many Afghans feel less secure then they did a year or more ago, 
including in parts of the country that have not been subject to the most violent attacks. 
T here is considerable anxiety and frustration over the widespread corruption in both the 
national and local govemments, as well as in the judiciary. A sizeable number of 
Afghans are becoming disenchanted with the Karzai govemment, particularly its apparent 
weakness and the endemic comtption of some of its leadership. Karzai himself is partly 
to blame for this disconcerting yet correct perception of his govemment. The 
c ircumstances of the primary arena game with the West have forced him to adopt a 
strategy of working with the regional warlords, but he has resisted efforts to purge the 
most corrupt officials from his administration .166 The existence of warlords is the reality 
in Afghani stan; in many places, they are the only real power on the ground. The United 
States invo lved the Northern Alliance and the warlords in their strategy from the very 
beginning without really thinking through the repercussions this m ay have for their future 
reconstruction endeavors. Those involved in the reconstruction process are not deali ng 
with one central govemment but a de facto one at the hands of the warlords as we ll. Th 
warlords have a strategy too. They want to retain their power within the country, and it is 
like ly they can with their cun·ent base of support. As a general rule, their strategy is not 
to rebuild the central authority, as is the mission of the West's gam e; the payoffs are not 
optimal, for by doing so they would lose their power. 
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Warlords in Afghanistan are another inhibitor to reconstruction efforts and the 
game of the U.S . and its allies. The U.S. brought the Northern Alliance and the warlords 
into the game and cannot just ignore their presence, as it further destabilizes the 
government and the country. It is hard at times to distinguish these groups as fri end or 
roe. What is c lear, however, is that they have been and will continue to be a key factor in 
Western success or failure in Afghanistan . 
4.4 Illegal Livelihood: Narcotics in Afghanistan 
Afghanistan is now a "narco-state." According to the latest UN World Drug 
Report, it produced ninety-two percent of the world ' s opium last year. 167 The illegal 
trade o f opium involves everyone from poverty-stricken farmers, to warlords, to senior 
government officials. The drug money generated by the opium economy buys weapons 
that are used to prolong the conflict; it fuels incessant corruption; and diminishes the 
chances of building a viable economy and a national system of law and order. It also 
rurther impedes resolution to the overarching game. 
There has been significant research conducted on the connection between natural 
resources and violent organized conflict. There are three general findings. First, 
continuous armed conflict often leads to increased levels of drug production and drug 
tra rfi cking. Many insurgents seize the opportunity to engage in narcotics growth, 
production and trade. Second, some research suggests that the drug industry and 
economy usua lly lasts the duration of the conflict ( if not longer). Lastly, there is a 
considerable link between an illicit drug economy and the fragility of states.168 
Arghani stan is certainly a country in conflict and has been for decades. For as long as 
78 
this, the drug economy has also been thriving. In its current f01m, it is also evident that 
w ithout a strong central government commanding authority, Afghanistan is certainly 
rragile. 
Currently there are two major sources of revenue into Afghanistan. The first 
comes from international aid, which is intended to support reconstruction and state-
building in the poor and war-ravaged country. The second is the drug economy. Profit 
rrom the poppy economy is estimated to reach $2 billion a year. 169 At the 2006 London 
Conference that created the Afghanistan Compact, the donors pledged around ten billion 
dollars in reconstruction aid over the next five years. 170 U nless these groups keep 
donating on this level for many more years to come, Afghanistan will need the money the 
d rug trade generates. With the high costs of running the country, it has become apparent 
that these resources are vital to Afghanistan. The narcotics economy consists of a long 
chain of people; it is a huge industry. At the very bottom ofthe ladder is the poor 
household farmer. Afghanistan is an agrarian society with most of its population liv ing 
in rural settlements. These farmers and their families are principally preoccupied with 
ensuring that they themselves are fed and healthy. There are many incentives for farmers 
to cultivate poppy: it is highly marketable, well-suited for storage, and uses little water. 
It is also beneficial for the economy in that it injects cash into the economy, stabilizes the 
currency, and generates work in rural areas. About twenty percent of the income stays 
\·Vith the producers which is good news for poor farmers. 171 
But a ll is not positive for the drug economy. First and foremost, it is illegal. lt 
can also be di sruptive to societal relations at the community level. The cultivation and 
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production of narcotics is an illegal activity, regardless ofthe level ofwidespread 
acceptance for it. Furthermore, the more the drug trade is criminalized by the law, the 
more like ly that it will be operated as a criminal activity, including the use of violence. 
T he drug economy in most circumstances negatively impacts on local governaJ1ce, de-
stabili zing the country. 172 Second, the drug trade fuels armed conflict. President Karzai 
is noted as saying that alongside oftelTorism, drugs are the biggest threat to 
Afghanistan's long-term security and development. "The trade in opium feeds the ev il of 
corruption that, together, are the most corrosive elements in AfghaJl society."173 
Indeed, there are many serious al1egations that the Taliban and the poppy trade are 
considerably interc01mected. New York Times reporter, Elizabeth Rubin, spent 
s ignifi cant time in Afghanistan to get a better understanding of the situation on the 
ground. To find out how the opium trade worked and how it is re lated to the ri se of the 
Ta liban, she interviewed a medium-level smuggler. He explained how the whole country 
was at the services of the drug trade from national soldiers to national policemen.174 The 
Taliban are connected to the trade, as well as many warlords who aJ·e now in the 
government. There is concern over what will improve this security situation.175 
A lthough farmers aJ·e drawn to poppy cultivation for a living, the majority of the profits 
go to the traffickers, warlords, militia leaders, and even the Taliban aJld al-Qa' ida. 176 
Whil e the Americans had more or less turned a blind eye to the drug-trade spree of their 
warlord allies, di fferent countries like Iran have tried to crack down. To travel safely 
w ith the drugs the smuggler travels in convoys w ith considerable am1ed protection, often 
on loan from the Taliban. 
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The drug trade is related to the violence of the Tali ban and pem1eates society, 
contributing to the endemic corruption. 177 Drug-related crime and corruption are rife in 
A rghanistan . ln the south of the country, the drug trade and the Taliban insurgency are 
connected intrinsically and they share a common interest in resisting government 
nuthority and international forces. Defeating the drug problem will take immense 
leadership from the Afghan government and a prolonged commitment on the part of the 
. . I . 178 111ternat10na commumty. 
rghanistan had record high opium production last year and it is expected to be 
even higher in 2007 if a more determined narcotics control program is not undertaken. 
But how does one wipe out an industry that employs an estimated 2.9 million people and 
cnuses so much conflict in the countTy? There have been three different solutions 
considered. The first is eradication where poppy crops are destroyed. The second is 
nlternative livelihoods, where farmers are given support to grow other legal crops. The 
third is legalization, where opium is purchased from producers and used to make legal 
painki llers. 179 Thus far, the international actors have been unable to fix the problem or 
come to some sort of consensus on what the best way to deal with the issue is. 
Eradication is favored by the United States. 180 But this method hits poor farmers the 
hardest and not those in production and trafficking to where the most violence is 
attributable. As long as eradication is the plan, those in the trade will not buy into it since 
it is a great source of revenue for them. Other countries like Canada favor alternative 
livelihoods. 18 1 How to make this transition, however, is not clear. Legalization as an 
option requires a functioni ng government- something that Afghanistan does not currently 
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possess. This task seems even harder considering many govemment officials are 
invo lved in the industry themselves in one way or another. Part of a successful 
reconstruction effort must involve economic reform as well. While the interveners 
contemplate the best way to counter this threat it is getting significantly worse. The 
opium industry involves a complex web of actors, some ofwhom are the enemy the U.S ., 
ISAF, and a llies are trying to defeat. The illegality of this economy, coupled with the 
violence, corruption, and instability it generates threatens both the legitimacy of the 
Afghan government and the entire reconstruction process. The opium industry certainly 
is ' nested' as its network is embedded within society, having both obvious participants 
and those more difficult to pinpoint. The war on terror must also involve a war on drugs 
i [this reconstruction effort is to succeed. To date, mired in its own strategy, the U.S. has 
not seriousl y grappled with this problem. 
4.5 Ethnic Disharmony 
Afghanistan has always been a country of many different tribes, reli gions and 
cthniciti es, which at times has led to volatility and tension within the state. Pashtuns are 
typical] y estimated to comprise forty to fotiy- five percent of the current population. Jt~2 
The Pashtun hav long dominated the national political scene, while Tajik, Uzbek and 
Hazara have significant regional autonomy. As previously mentioned, when the Taliban 
emerged, its members were embraced predominantly by the Pashtun population, less for 
their ideology and more because they brought stability and rule of law. There were very 
few of the other major groups within Taliban ranks. All ofthose groups had their own 
regional forces and leaders. 
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One of the effects of the war on terror and the American military intervention into 
Afghani stan has been to shift the balance of ethno-political power away from the 
Pashtun. Afghanistan is no longer a 'Pashtun state.' When the U nited States chose the 
Northern A lliance as an ally, its warlord generals (ofTajik, Uzbek and Hazara origin) 
fou nd themselves in powerful positions in the new provisional government. The Pashtun 
popul ation was wary of this and it has been difficult fo r many to accept. Furthermore, the 
Pashtuns themselves are an ethni cally divided community, split along regional and 
ideo logical lines, as well as by loyalties to di fferent leaders. For instance, there are 
numerous differences between the East and the South. 183 Political reconstruction cannot 
take place without addressing the concerns of the Pashtuns about security, participation, 
and representation. Be that as it may, the other groups cannot be ignored either. Many 
Pashtuns feel that other ethnic minorities have too much of a voice at the table, not 
because of political standing, but instead due to the support of international actors. A 
critical concern for the Pashtuns is security. ln the early years of the intervention, there 
was signifi cant settling of scores by the Hazaras, Uzbeks and Taj iks among themselves to 
control the once Taliban dominated territories. Many Pashtun are finding themselves 
internall y displaced .184 
Simultaneously, there are worries about how ethnicity and religion in surrounding 
countries may effect the shaky situation in Afghanistan. As previously discussed, there 
are close ti es between Pashtun in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. The desi re of m any to 
have these groups unified by some could cause considerable upheaval. Pro-Tali ban 
e lements in Pakistan threaten the internal stability of Afghanistan. The recent emergence 
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or suicide bombing in Afghanistan, a practice notably common in Iraq, has become 
disturbingly frequent among ' neo-Taliban.' This new extremism can potentially cause 
great disruption in the country. If the country's largest etlmic groups feel that they do not 
have a stake in the reconstruction process, the attacks may become a sign of a worsening 
s ituation in the future. 185 For countries like Afghanistan, ethnicity can be an incredible 
source of conflict. This is certainly the case in the country as former ethnic lines of 
dom inance are shifting and power is moving hands. Ensuring that all ethnic groups are 
included in government is vital to the success ofreconstruction and to the eventual end of 
conflict. Jnstead of trying to bring unity to the country, the groups seem to be only 
fu rther polarizing. The resurgence of the Taliban is very troublesome as well. The 
interveners cam1ot view the ethnic situation as Taliban and the rest. Different groups 
have different expectations and come from varying backgrounds and lifestyles. Not 
everyone is go ing to be so quick to accept the situation as is. It would be a rational 
strategy for local Pashtun elites to turn to support the resurgent Taliban if they fear a non-
Pashtun dominated government. Likewise, other groups may support local warlords if 
they fear the opposite. While the Karzai government holds the responsibility for 
maintaining a fair and equitable govenm1ent, the intervention must view the ethnic 
situation in the same manner. There is great tension between different parties and the 
ituation could evolve into a powder keg if respect for these tribal di fferences is not taken 
into consideration by the foreign powers. The current Westem strategy needs to com to 
grips with this arena and the actors involved; they are not dealing with a homogenous 
population. Afghans of different ethnicities are not going to suppoti reconstruction 
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endeavors, a new govemment, and ultimately a Westem strategy for Afghanistan that 
docs not have adequate payoffs - one that does not represent them and their interests. 
As is evident from the preceding analysis of the situation in Afghanistan, the 
rea lity on the ground is both complex and convoluted. What the nested games approach 
has made evident is that the irrational behavior of actors in the principal arena can be 
ex plai ned by successful strategies toward equilibrium at the nested game level. Given the 
nested games in Afghanistan and the desire to achieve optimal outcomes by actors at th is 
level, it is unJikely there will be success and therefore equilibrium in the principal arena, 
s ince both observer and actors do not hold mutually optimal strategies toward post-
confli ct reconstruction. The West needs a multi-tiered strategy that addresses all arenas if 
they w ish to see some success. 
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Cbaptet· Five- Conclusion 
"This nation is peaceful , but fierce when stined to anger. The conflict was begun on the 
timing and terms of others. It wi II end in a way, and at an hour, of our choosing. " 1 R6 
President George W. Bush 
The United States of America and its Western allies entered the war on ten·or and 
the country of Afghanistan with a mission to rid the world of terrorists who threaten the 
peace and security of all and to reconstruct the state of Afghanistan into one that would 
be democratic and safe for its own people and for others too; a nobly planned endeavor. 
Although the intervention into Afghanistan might be justifiable, the motivations and 
purposes for doing so have not always been in the best interests of the country or 
executed in a manner that would lead to successful reconstruction. There has been self-
interest guiding the policy of interveners, as well as an incomplete perspective of the 
actual issues inhibiting success of the Western intervention. Ensuring Afghanistan 's 
stability is imperative for peace in the region. Southern Asia and the Middle East have 
a lways been two of the most volatile regions of the world. The threat of extremism and 
terrorism that exudes from this region is a concern not merely to neighboring countries, 
but states the world over. There was not a perceived threat from Afghanistan, there was a 
real threat. However, the intervention has been doomed to fail from the start because the 
Western strategy has failed to focus on any games outside of that in the principal arena. 
The initi al mi litary action taken under Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and 
the JSAF response was successful in rooting out great numbers of al-Qa' ida and Tali ban 
militants who had attacked the United States and were wreaking havoc on their own 
country. The reconstruction effort by external actors within Afghanistan, however, has 
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not been successful. In 2007, the future of NATO's mission is so uncertain that the 
possibility of withdrawal has even been considered. More frequently, there is discussion 
or extending the mission in Afghanistan and having a long presence there. This alone is 
ev idence that reconstruction to this point is not working and has not been effective. 
Current NATO policies and programs in Afghanistan are not on course to achieve their 
objectives. Some policies are working, but many more are not. If major conflict occurs 
at the present rate, there is a real risk that the Afghan population will become increasi ngly 
frustrated by the lack of security and change, and that some allies will head home. This 
is an action that many Canadians would have their military take within the next year. 
Expectations in Afghanistan have been high, but there are perceived and real 
cl i fferences in standards of governance and life between Afghanistan and the Western 
countri es. The language of the Western intervention has been one of liberation, featuring 
rights, democratic statebui lding, and Marshall Plan tactics. The invasion was based on an 
understanding that while ai-Qa'ida was a threat, the roots of the conflict and violence 
could be traced to an Afghan failure of governance. In the eyes of the West, it was 
therefore necessary for the Taliban to be defeated and for Afghanistan to begi n the 
transition to democracy. Democracy has been the guiding ideal for the reconstruction 
efforts. Nevertheless, there has been a tension between the U.S. commitment to military 
operations under OEF, and internationally mandated security and peacebuilding 
activities. Reconstruction in Afghanistan has not been getting the commitment it 
requires. Simultaneously, insurgency has increased, growing numbers of soldiers are 
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being killed, and more troops are being sent overseas to fight in a war that is entering its 
seventh year. 
As the situation in Afghanistan worsens for the interveners, fai lure and indeed 
withdrawal or mission extension have to be considered . The fact that this has been taken 
into consideration suggests that there has always been a strategy and a gam e being 
played. A game that could be the West 's to lose. While the forces had been successful in 
e liminating much of the enemy, the country is still in chaos and is failing. "Failure" of 
the mission wou ld most likely arise if, after one or two more years, participating 
members witness increased instability, greater enemy attacks, heightened NATO 
casua lties, and a floundering central government - a course that will lead many member 
states to withdraw. Since 2004 a ll of these situations have become reali ty. Instabi lity has 
increased significantly in the past few years, a new insurgency has threatened the Jives of 
both troops and civilians, NATO has seen more losses in the past year than in any of the 
preceding ones, and the central govemment is losing control of the periphery and the 
support of its people. The central govemment elected in 2004 has done little to improve 
the political, economic and social situation within Afghanistan and the interveners have 
been overly caught up in military issues, though they have not addressed them properly, 
to work towards a holistic reconstruction effort. 
The rea li ty on the ground in Afghanistan is extremely complex and backed by an 
even more complicated and chaotic history. Reconstruction is not an easy task but 
ne ither has it been approached in a suitable manner. Reconstruction in Afghani stan has 
focused on solving the game in the principal arena of defeating the Tali ban and installi ng 
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liberal-democratic political and economic institutions in the state. The West has set 
unreali stic goals for building state institutions, promoting liberal values, and promoting 
democracy within only one arena. lt is impractical to expect Afghanistan to rebuild 
institutions as well as adopt and absorb liberal values at such speed. It is also out of sync 
with the historical and cultural legacy of the country. Democracy is a laudable goal and 
it may be the ultimate one in Afghanistan. However, democracy should be of Afghan 
design and not an imported Western version. Ultimately, people can only secure 
democracy for themselves; although they may have some assistance from outside parties. 
Impos ing democracy from the outside is a recipe for failure. In the case of Afghanistan 
they were not even the best intentions. 
The intervention into Afghanistan sees the gam e as a simplistic defeat of the 
Tali ban and the implementation of liberal-democratic nom1s. The pre-emptive nature of 
the Bush Doctrine proves that the elimination ofthe Taliban is part of the Western 
strategy, as well as ensuring democracy. But defeating the Taliban is sometimes at odds 
w ith creating democracy; e.g. the use of warlords as Western allies, although they do not 
want democracy. There is the problem of a contradiction in the Western game to begin 
with. Ex ternal powers seek to impose a liberal-democratic system on a country that is not 
receptive to it based on internal realities. There are numerous games in other arenas 
being played simultaneously, nested within the larger game, and they have not been taken 
into account. The nested games are many - Taliban and al-Qa'ida insurgents threatening 
foreign troops and civilians, warlords with great power who hold places in the central 
government and in the provinces, a drug economy that involves millions of Afghans, a 
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volati le relationship with neighboring Pakistan, and unstable relations among ethnic 
groups. While the Western powers are aware of these challenges, they have made only a 
minimal attempt, at best, to address them. The pillars of the Western strategy - defeating 
the Taliban and installing democracy- are at cross-purposes with each other even before 
the nested games are considered. Once the nested games are added into the equation, the 
Western strategy becomes completely unworkable. Contextual factors, ofwhich the 
actors are aware, lead to different strategies between the observer and the actors. 
However, only when there are mutually optimal strategies will equi librium be reached, 
and ultimately success in the primary arena. In trying to bring about successful strategies 
al the nested game level, the actors' behavior in the principal arena appears irrational to 
the observer, restricting the success the West desires. 
5. 1 Canadians in. Afghanistan: Responding to Nested Games 
One country that is considered to have had some success with reconstruction in 
Afghanistan is Canada. Within Canada debate over the country's involvement in 
Afghanistan is becoming increasingly heated. The recent deaths of Canadian soldiers at 
the hands ofTaliban insurgents have many Canadians questioning the utility of the 
mission and calling for withdrawal of troops within the next few years. 187 The number of 
soldi ers killed in battle is hard to ignore, but this does not mean that the Canadian 
mission is failing. The rising toll of casualties is drowning out any consideration of the 
real progress being made. Canadians are not just in Afghanistan to fight, they are also 
there to reconstruct. While Canada is part of ISAF and will therefore bear part of the 
weight of its success or fai lure, it has made positive inroads in acknowledging the nested 
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games in this war on terror, and in doing so have seen positive progress in their 
endeavors. 
Since 2001, Canada, as part oflSAF, has appli ed the "3Ds" to expand its presence 
in Afghanistan - defence, development and diplomacy. A United Nations Security 
Council resolution at the end of2001 mandated the ISAF to assist the Afghan 
Transitiona l Authority by providing security in Kabul. In 2004, Canada took 
responsibility for Kandahar province after NATO member countries vo lunteered to 
deploy to more secure provinces. Kandahar is one ofthe most dangerous of all the 
provinces in Afghanistan. Canadian forces took over the Provincial Reconstruction Team 
(PRT) there. While the primary role of the forces stationed in Kandahar has been 
security, Canada has supported other stabilization and peacebuilding initiatives, 
particularly in the area of demobilization, disarmament, and re-integration of ex-
combatants (DDR). 188 The best way to look at Canadian and Afghan operations in 
Kandahar province is to divide them into "shield" operations and "build" operations, 
which are interwoven. The "shield" function refers to the obvious security measures. 
The Kandahar Reconstruction Team (KPRT) working with the Afghan govemment and 
aid agencies is the "bui ld" part of the equation. 189 There is redevelopment occurring 
across most of the country. Unfortunately, what is conveyed in the news tends to be of a 
negative nature, accentuating deaths over new begitmings. 
Canada has been particularly diligent in the area of rule of law and justice, and 
they have coordi nated their work around that. They have been helping local councils to 
make the government more legitimate, but it is a role of guidance where the Afghans 
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themselves choose the projects. They have assisted with everything from teaching how 
to write legislation to running ministries in this area. The Canadian army has been 
training the Afghan National Army (ANA) and in this endeavor they have had great 
success.
190 The army has definitely improved and is well on its way to being able to 
function independently. The RCMP has also been training police. While progress in thi s 
undertaking has been much slower, a police force is desperately needed. The Canadian 
government has been putting more of its money into these tasks, as it is a more effective 
usc of taxpayer dollars. Real change is happening. 19 1 There has been a significant focu s 
on the court system as well, and Canadians have been learning how to work with 
traditiona l justice systems. One cannot assume that the Afghans need the system Canada 
or other Western countries operate under. There is a fine balance to be achieved betw en 
enacting justice and making it a witch-hunt. It is hoped that with Afghans and Canadians 
working together on this project, that an adequate and fair system may be established. 192 
Of particular relevance to the nested games problem, Canada has attempted to 
respond to the narcotics problem. Canada favors the alternative livelihoods option. The 
belief here is that eradication hurts the poor. Therefore, concentration of efforts has been 
on apprehend ing the level above the farmer, thereby cutting off the trade, then working 
with these farmers on different crops they may be able to grow and harvest with success. 
To deal with the warlord problem, Canada is involved with DIAG - Disarmament 
for Illegally Armed Groups. This has been a tougher challenge for Canadians in 
reconstruction, for as long as there is insecurity in the country it is hard to get groups to 
give up their atms. Nevertheless, Canada is a key player in this mission and it is not a 
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task they are willing to give up on just yet. 193 These are Canada' s main contributions to 
the reconstruction process; however, there have been many great achievements in 
Kandahar province in the areas of health and education. Polio as been all but eradicated 
fro m the province and infant mortality in the region has taken a dramatic downturn .194 
l(andahar is still a volatile province and the securi ty threats continue to ex ist. 
Acknowledging this, the Canadian reconstruction team has not forgotten the other duty it 
i there to complete - reconstruction. It w ill be many years before Afghani stan is 
' reconstructed ' if it ever is at all, but if these types of pursuits continue one should see a 
drastic change in Afghan society. The Canadian team at the very least has considered the 
internal dynamics and the relationships of di fferent players in their attempts at 
reconstruction . 
evertheless, Canada is still part of the West's principal arena gam e. They 
entered Afghanistan in 2001 to support the United States and ISAF in its endeavors to 
fi ght terro ri sm and make the country a more safe and democratic place. These are goals 
that ultimately derive from the Bush Doctrine, even if this is not the public ly stated 
intention. An imposed democratic rule of law and the pre-emptive removal of terrorist 
support networks fall in line with the pursuits of countries like the United States. Canada 
is undoubtedly making reconstructive progress in Afghanistan and they are at least 
somewhat aware of the nested games in the country, trying to solve these problems. The 
socio-economic s ituation is improving in Kandahar province and some incremental 
measures that have been undertaken are beginning to take effect. These successes should 
93 
not be undermined. However, the motivations and strategy appears to originate from the 
sam e ideals as the U.S. policies of pre-emptive security and forced democratization . 
5.2 Final Remarks 
Afghanistan has not been improving sign ificantly since the intervention began. 
The primary arena game has been the focus to the neglect of nested games; this is a game 
in multiple arenas. There has also been an ignorance of the multiple players' payoffs. 
The payoffs from the nested games are often greater than compliance with the Western 
game. There is frustration on the part of the West that Karzai and his government are not 
ab le to adopt and implement a properly functioning democratic government. The choices 
of the Afghan government appear to be suboptimal in this game. This viewpoint is held 
because the interveners have an incomplete perspective, or they see what is go ing on but 
fai I to approach the situation with an understanding of the other actors' interests. For 
example, the Americans want to eradicate the poppy crop but this is not workable 
because it hurts the rural poor who are onl y trying to survive. 
The nested games constrain the achievement of what the West desires, as well as 
the effectiveness of policy choices, i.e. the relationship with warlords who were made 
part of the government but continue in their cotTupt ways. Endogenous rules and 
mechanisms allow individuals to get things done at a local level. The people within 
Afghani stan are able to help with reconstruction because they know what it is they need . 
The rules of the principal arena game need to be altered and defined in the appropriate 
manner. Only then is cooperation possible and will reconstruction be successful. 
Occupying forces need to play a more mediating and less overbearing role. 
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Reconstruction efforts must be driven from within. When these nested games are 
addressed and internal powers are granted more involvement in reconstructing their own 
country, then more optimal outcome may be realized. It is possible for reconstruction to 
become more cooperative, but only when all stakeholders are involved. Reconstruction 
can be guided, but f·undamentally intervention will enable a secure environment when 
indigenous Afghans work to create sustaining institutions. 
The U.S. and the international community do not need Afghanistan to become a 
modern democratic state or even an internally united one to protect their key interests, 
namely security. They require a cessation of serious armed conflict and sufficient access 
Lo the country to ensure it does not once again harbour teiTorists. However, to gain thi s 
access and reach an end to conflict they need to pay attention to Afghanistan 's nested 
games and realize that liberal-democracy may not be the saving grace of every country 
Lhey try and reconstruct. 
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